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ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the viability of legislation extending labor 
rights to workers currently excluded from protection in the on-demand 
economy. Uber, perhaps the most well-known business operating in the 
on-demand economy, classifies its drivers as independent contractors, 
which strips them of federal rights to organize a union. Uber argues that 
its algorithm-based business model has essentially transformed the 
employment relationship, suggesting traditional labor laws are no longer 
necessary. This argument is belied by the economic realities of the workers 
who make those algorithms possible and profitable. While some prefer 
working multiple “gigs,” many on-demand workers struggle to piece 
together full-time hours and minimum wages; they possess neither the 
individual bargaining power of contractors nor the collective bargaining 
power of employees. 
In the absence of federal leadership to correct this imbalance, state 
and local governments have begun taking steps toward regulating the on-
demand economy. The Seattle City Council passed an innovative 
ordinance in 2015 giving drivers for rideshare companies like Uber and 
Lyft the right to form unions and collectively negotiate labor contracts. 
The ordinance was swiftly challenged with a lawsuit by the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, and the viability of such measures to withstand legal 
challenge remains undetermined. Last year, more than 35,000 Uber drivers 
in New York City formed a modern-day “guild,” a move that just narrowly 
preceded the high profile class action settlement—which was later 
overturned—by Uber drivers in California who challenged their 
independent contractor designation. As more and more workers are 
classified as independent contractors, some scholars and labor advocates 
have suggested replacing traditional employment-based benefits, such as 
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disability insurance, retirement accounts, and paid sick days with a set of 
“portable benefits.” But none of these patchwork solutions guarantee to 
on-demand workers the firm establishment of collective bargaining 
rights—the traditional cornerstone of American labor law. 
Though the technology fueling the on-demand economy is new, the 
restructuring of work to evade labor law protections is not. The author’s 
prior research on the use of outsourcing, subcontracting, and 
misclassification in the late 1990s established a framework for analyzing 
when such workers—dependent contractors—should be endowed with 
the same labor protections as their employee counterparts, and when they 
should be considered to be truly independent contractors. This analytical 
approach has found new relevance in the age of Uber and the on-demand 
economy. This Article analyzes the relationships created within the on-
demand economy and provides an in-depth analysis of the federal 
preemption and antitrust issues raised by collective bargaining laws like 
Seattle’s in order to determine whether state and local attempts to regulate 
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INTRODUCTION 
Stepping confidently to the curb and boldly extending an arm—once 
the mark of a true New Yorker—has been replaced with a swipe and a 
click, as there are now more Uber drivers on Manhattan’s streets than 
yellow cabs.1 Yet it is not merely the choreography that has changed. As 
the undisputed leader of the on-demand economy—an economic system 
that uses online platforms to connect workers and sellers with clients and 
consumers—Uber’s innovative business model navigates around 
traditional workplace laws.2 By classifying its drivers as independent 
contractors, the company legally evades millions of dollars in payroll taxes 
and prevents its workers from accessing critical employment protections, 
such as wage and hour standards, safety requirements, anti-discrimination 
laws, and the right to form a labor union.3 
Responding to increasing community pressure to correct this 
imbalance, the Seattle City Council—demonstrating that local 
governments can also innovate in this new economy—voted unanimously, 
in December 2015, to give drivers for rideshare companies like Uber and 
Lyft the right to form a union and bargain collectively over the terms and 
conditions of their work.4 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a powerful 
employer lobby, swiftly filed a lawsuit on the industry’s behalf to block 
implementation of the ordinance.5 Meanwhile, attempts to litigate the 
employment status of Uber and Lyft drivers have, to date, resulted only in 
                                                     
 1. See Melkorka Licea, Elizabeth Ruby & Rebecca Harshbarger, More Uber Cars than Yellow 
Taxis on the Road in NYC, N.Y. POST (Mar. 17, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/03/17/more-uber-cars-
than-yellow-taxis-on-the-road-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/C2EQ-KBTH]. 
 2. See Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 98–102 
(2015); see also Oisin Hanrahan, We Must Protect the On-Demand Economy to Protect the Future of 
Work, WIRED, Nov. 9, 2015, at 9. 
 3. Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Independent Contractor v. Employee 3 (Policy 
Brief of the Nat’l Emp. Law Project 2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Policy-Brief-
Independent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VNS-XE33]. 
 4. Daniel Beekman, Seattle First U.S. City to Give Uber, Other Contract Drivers Power to 
Unionize, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/unions-
for-taxi-uber-drivers-seattle-council-votes-today/. 
 5. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Com., U.S. Chamber Files Lawsuit Challenging Seattle’s 
Drivers’ Union Ordinance (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-
files-lawsuit-challenging-seattle-s-drivers-union-ordinance [https://perma.cc/U6KY-268T]. 
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legal settlements that provide limited gains to drivers, but no judicial 
clarity to the murky classification of drivers as independent contractors.6 
Though the technology fueling the on-demand economy is new, the 
structuring of work in order to obscure or obviate labor law protections is 
not. Prior research on the use of outsourcing, subcontracting, and 
misclassification in the late 1990s, as well as frameworks that can help 
determine when so-called “dependent contractors” should be protected by 
labor and employment laws, has found new relevance in the age of Uber.7 
This Article analyzes the relationships created within the on-demand 
economy, using those prior frameworks, in order to determine under what 
circumstances independent contractors working in on-demand industries 
should have the right to form a union and bargain collectively. 
Section I provides an overview of the “on-demand dilemma”—the 
inherent tension created between the structure of on-demand employment, 
which is based on an exclusive independent-contractor model, and 
national labor policy that is predicated on a more inclusive employment 
model. It further details the particular nature of work in the on-demand 
economy and identifies the gaps in existing labor and employment law for 
protecting on-demand workers. This section concludes that the 
construction of alternate work arrangements in order to avoid and evade 
workplace regulation is not a new phenomenon. The nation’s labor history 
is replete with examples of the misclassification of marginalized workers 
to evade labor laws, as well as the application of antitrust law to defeat 
                                                     
 6. Drivers for Uber have enjoyed greater success challenging their independent contractor status 
outside of the United States. In October, a UK employment tribunal ruled that Uber drivers are 
employees, not independent contractors, calling the company’s characterization of its relationship with 
drivers “a pure fiction which bears no relation to the real dealings and relationships between the 
parties.” Aslam v. Uber, [2016] Emp. Tribunals (Eng.), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/aslam-and-farrar-v-uber-reasons-20161028.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7EW-
892J]; Natasha Lomas, Uber Loses Employment Tribunal in the UK, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/28/uber-loses-employment-tribunal-in-the-uk/ [https://perma.cc/ 
E3J9-RGKQ]. A similar legal challenge in Spain has made its way to Europe’s top court, the European 
Court of Justice, which is scheduled to rule this year on whether Uber is a digital platform or a 
transportation company. A decision against Uber would require the company to comply with national 
labor regulations of the twenty-eight EU Member States. Natasha Lomas, Uber Drivers Deemed  
to be Employees by Swiss Insurance Provider, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/05/uber-drivers-judged-to-be-employees-by-swiss-insurance-
provider/ [https://perma.cc/R9LN-C234]. 
 7. See Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights for 
“Dependent Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 144–168 (2005); see also ARAN 
SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF  
CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (MIT Press 2016); Françoise Carré, (In)dependent Contractor 
Misclassification, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1 (June 8, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/independent-
contractor-misclassification/ [https://perma.cc/66LQ-WRB4]; Tim Fitzsimons, In a Sharing 
Economy, Labor Laws Fall Short, NPR MARKETPLACE (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.marketplace.org/ 
2015/04/23/tech/sharing-economy-labor-laws-fall-short [https://perma.cc/D9PJ-BSQE]. 
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nascent attempts to organize unions and bargain collectively. Today’s on-
demand dilemma evokes the prior decade’s “dependent contractor 
dilemma,” the past generation’s “domestic worker dilemma,” and the pre-
Wagner Act’s “labor dilemma.”8 
Section II profiles recent initiatives at the state and local level to 
regulate wages and working conditions for independent contractors in the 
on-demand economy. Rather than wait for the federal government to 
clarify the employment status of on-demand workers or to modernize the 
classification system itself, state and local governments have begun 
asserting their police powers to tackle the impacts of the on-demand 
dilemma. The most notable and closely watched example is that of Seattle, 
which enacted a groundbreaking collective bargaining law in December 
2015.9 This ordinance, which extends the right to form a union to drivers 
for rideshare companies like Uber and Lyft, is closely watched by 
jurisdictions around the country to see whether it will survive legal 
challenges. Meanwhile, other states and cities have taken various 
legislative and executive approaches to fill the gaps in federal workplace 
protection into which many of their own citizens fall.10 
Given the importance of the Seattle law in our understanding of what 
is possible in this new era of workplace organization and regulation, 
Section III provides a detailed analysis of the antitrust and federal 
preemption issues raised by challengers of the law. Seattle’s approach has 
been the most innovative, extensive, and successful of the state and local 
initiatives. Yet, the arguments raised by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
echo many of the same arguments made by employers throughout U.S. 
labor history used to undermine any legal expansion of workers’ rights. 
As Section III explains, the historically successful use of federal antitrust 
law to defeat union organization does not predict defeat of the Seattle 
ordinance. However, a very careful understanding of the particular 
conditions relevant to the rideshare industry will be important in 
determining whether or not the extension of collective bargaining rights to 
on-demand contractors can withstand legal challenges. This section draws 
upon my prior dependent contractor framework to better understand the 
tensions and legal issues inherent in the current economy, as well as the 
viability of city and state regulatory innovation. 
                                                     
 8. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2640–41 (2014); see also Kennedy, supra note 7; sources 
cited infra note 67. 
 9. Beekman, supra note 4. 
 10. See discussion infra Part II. 
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I. THE ON-DEMAND DILEMMA 
A. The Economic Landscape 
Each new treatise, article, and manifesto produces a new moniker: 
the “sharing economy,” “gig economy,” “1099 economy,” “Uber 
economy,”11 or “online platform economy.”12 Each attempts to describe 
an economic system that uses online platforms to connect workers and 
sellers with clients and consumers. These platforms, which take the form 
of smartphone applications, tout flexibility and convenience for 
participants—workers and sellers are not bound to any particular schedule, 
hours of work, or long-term rental agreement (yet neither are they 
guaranteed any). The most well-known company operating in this 
economy is Uber, which connects private drivers with individual riders.13 
Online platforms can be labor-based, such as Uber, Handy, or TaskRabbit, 
or capital-based, such as Etsy or AirBnB.14 Customers pay “piece-rate” for 
the goods or services, and the online intermediary takes a fee for 
facilitating the transaction.15 This Article refers to the emerging economy 
as the “on-demand economy,” an economic structure projected to be worth 
$335 billion by 2025.16 
Discussion of the on-demand economy has focused largely on the 
benefits to consumers. After all, powerful consumer demand drives and 
                                                     
 11. See Ilaria Maselli, Karolien Lenaerts & Miroslav Beblavý, Five Things We Need to Know 
About the On-Demand Economy, CEPS 2 (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS% 
20Essay%20No%2021%20On%20Demand%20Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL8W-ZQJV]. 
 12. See DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., PAYCHECKS, 
PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY: BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY 5 (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-volatility-2-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/724S-TBM6] [hereinafter BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY]. 
 13. See Arvind Malhotra & Marshall Van Alstyne, The Dark Side of the Sharing Economy . . . 
and How to Lighten It, 57 COMM. ACM 24, 24 (Nov. 2014). Other on-demand businesses include 
Lyft, Handy, TaskRabbit, Mechanical Turk, and AirBnB. 
 14. See BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY, supra note 12. 
 15. Id. at 20. 
 16. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, THE SHARING ECONOMY 12 (2015), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-
sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3PS-YM8L]. One recent analysis of aggregate national data 
concluded that while “we all share a strong intuition that the nature of work has fundamentally 
changed, contributing to the deterioration of labor standards . . . it has been hard to find evidence of a 
strong, unambiguous shift toward nonstandard or contingent forms of work—especially in contrast to 
the dramatic increase in wage inequality.” Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the 
Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 22843, 2016), https://irs.princeton.edu/sites/irs/files/An%20Analysis% 
20of%20the%20Labor%20Market%20for%20Uber%E2%80%99s%20Driver-Partners%20in% 
20the%20United%20States%20587.pdf  [hereinafter Labor Market Analysis] (citing Annette 
Bernhardt, Labor Standards and the Reorganization of Work: Gaps in Data and Research 107 (Inst. 
for Res. in Lab. & Emp., Working Paper No. 100–14, 2014), http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2014/Labor-
Standards-and-the-Reorganization-of-Work.pdf). 
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defines this economy as well as its relationship to the future of work.17 
Consumers cite ease of use, independent consumer reviews, and 
competitive pricing as benefits of transacting in the on-demand 
economy.18 Yet, as a marketplace for work, high start-up costs push 
entrepreneurs to seek aggressive cost savings. In that pursuit, employment 
taxes and other workplace liabilities appear to be low-hanging fruit.19 
Central to the business model of most on-demand companies is the 
characterization of its workforce as “independent contractors,” rather than 
employees, “breaking jobs into small tasks that create erratic schedules 
and fluctuating income, and making it difficult for workers to take 
collective action.”20 
Indeed, the profitability for entrepreneurs of smartphone 
applications, such as Uber, depends almost entirely upon the efficiency 
with which such applications extract labor from the workers who provide 
the goods or services promised. While companies like Uber and Lyft claim 
to be in the technology business, the technological platform itself is 
valueless without the labor powering its application.21 These companies 
                                                     
 17. See Hanrahan, supra note 2 (“The innovative ideas that have emerged in this sector have 
created new ways for consumers to obtain the services they need while simultaneously creating great 
new opportunities for the people who are ready to supply those services. In the case of our platform, 
Handy, we’ve made it easier for people who need home services (such as plumbing or cleaning) to 
connect with qualified professionals who provide those services. More importantly, we’re connecting 
professionals to new opportunities to make money.”). 
 18. See Charles Colby & Kelly Bell, The On-Demand Economy is Growing, and not Just for the 
Young and Wealthy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/the-on-demand-
economy-is-growing-and-not-just-for-the-young-and-wealthy [https://perma.cc/YX2Q-TDET]. 
 19. See Nancy Cremins, The Rise of the On Demand Economy: The Tension Between Current 
Employment Laws and Modern Workforce Realities, BOS. BAR J., Winter 2016, at 27, 27 (“Building 
the infrastructure for an on demand business that serves many customers in multiple cities, or even 
multiple countries, is an incredibly expensive endeavor.”). 
 20. REBECCA SMITH & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT, RIGHTS ON DEMAND: 
ENSURING WORKPLACE STANDARDS AND WORKER SECURITY IN THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY  
3 (2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Rights-On-Demand-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9CK6-TW3T] [hereinafter RIGHTS ON DEMAND]. See also Sec. Tom Perez, Remarks at the Dep’t of 
Labor Future of Work Symposium, in Washington D.C. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/ 
newsroom/speech/20151210 [https://perma.cc/K95L-BRLH] (“The challenges associated with the on-
demand economy in many ways aren’t really new ones, and they’re not unique to app-driven digital 
platforms. We’ve been dealing with them for decades, before a phone could fit in your pocket, well 
before you could order groceries by touching an icon on a hand-held device.”). 
 21. Uber has invested heavily in driverless technology, though its initial rollout in its hometown 
of San Francisco found the company running afoul once more with regulators. Unlike its competitors, 
such as Google and Tesla, Uber failed to obtain the autonomous vehicle permit from the DMV, a 
requirement in place since 2014. Rather than battle the State, Uber simply placed its test vehicles on 
flatbed trucks and drove them to Arizona, whose governor had already signaled on social media that 
the company and its innovative vehicles would be welcomed. Eric Newcomer & Ellen Huet, Uber 
Ships Self-Driving Cars to Arizona After California Ban, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-22/uber-pulls-self-driving-cars-from-california-
for-arizona [https://perma.cc/9TQX-LPZ2]. 
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deliver to their customers not technology, but cheapened labor, making 
them closer to Manpower than to Microsoft. It is the laborer, however, and 
not the so-called “tech company” that is shouldering all of the risk and 
reaping few of the rewards.22 
The success of on-demand companies like Uber have led some 
industry analysts to conclude that their algorithm-based business models 
have transformed the employment relationship,23 making traditional labor 
laws unnecessary.24 Emerging data on the economic realities experienced 
by on-demand workers, however, belie this assertion, as wage insecurity 
and vast disparities in bargaining power have become inherent in the 
expanding industry.25 Importantly, most but not all on-demand businesses 
classify their workers as independent contractors rather than employees, 
which excludes those workers from protections under most labor laws, 
including the right to form a union.26 While the smartphone technology 
fueling the growth of this economy is new, the use of independent 
contractors to evade employment law is not.27 For decades, employers 
from Silicon Valley to Detroit have pursued aggressive strategies of 
subcontracting and outsourcing, which has shifted work from employees 
to independent contractors.28 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
stopped conducting its Contingent Worker Survey in 2005, but Secretary 
Tom Perez announced that the BLS is working with the Census Bureau to 
                                                     
 22. This premise extends to on-demand industries in which property, not labor, is the central 
component of the business model. In the case of AirBnB, a “short-term home rental service,” the 
company sued New York City over legislation that fines apartment dwellers $7,500 for illegally listing 
their apartment on a rental platform such as AirBnB. New York City does not allow a tenant to rent 
out their apartment for a period of less than thirty days. While the company opposed the fines, it 
capitulated once an agreement was reached with the City, pursuant to which only the hosts may be 
fined and not the company. Katie Benner, AirBnB Ends Fight with City over Fines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
3, 2016, at A4. 
 23. Irving Wladawsky-Berger, The On-Demand Economy Is Reshaping the Firm, and Society as 
We Know It, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (Dec. 25, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/12/25/on-demand-
economy-is-reshaping-the-firm-and-society-as-we-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/WR8P-HAXD]. 
 24. See Hanrahan, supra note 2, at 9; Rogers, supra note 2. 
 25. See generally DIGITAL LABOR: THE INTERNET AS PLAYGROUND AND FACTORY (T. Scholz 
ed., Routledge 2016); Steven Greenhouse, Uber: On the Road to Nowhere, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 7, 
2015), http://prospect.org/article/road-nowhere-3 [https://perma.cc/5J2Z-LQS7]; John Herrman, The 
Uber Counterculture: Chatter and Dissent in the Trenches of the Sharing Economy, AWL (Nov. 17, 
2015), https://theawl.com/the-uber-counterculture-ad0674aba359#.d9mt7lwcr [https://perma.cc/ 
MGJ3-HL6X]; Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A 
Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3758 (2016. See also Perez, supra note 20. 
 26. See RIGHTS ON DEMAND, supra note 20, at 4; see also Fitzsimons, supra note 7. 
 27. See Carré, supra note 7. 
 28. See Eli Dourado & Christopher Koopman, Evaluating the Growth of the 1099 Workforce, 
MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON U. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/ 
evaluating-growth-1099-workforce [https://perma.cc/PM3G-CAJJ]; see also HARVARD WORKERS 
CTR., OUTSOURCING, ITS DISCONTENTS, AND SOME SOLUTIONS 1 (2001), http://isites.harvard.edu/ 
fs/docs/icb.topic1320223.files/outsourcing%20report.pdf. 
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rerun the Contingent Worker Supplement to the May 2017 Current 
Population Survey.29 
Even without that data, however, we can compare the experiences of 
on-demand workers to those of independent contractors in the beginning 
of the last decade. For example, the 2005 survey found that independent 
contractors were less likely to have health insurance coverage than 
traditional employees.30 While the passage of the Affordable Care Act has 
significantly expanded coverage for all workers, about half of the drivers 
for Uber receive employer-provided health insurance from their employer 
at another job, their spouse’s job, or another family member’s job.31 
Taking Uber as an example, once applicants qualify to work for (or, 
in Uber-speak, “partner with”) the company, they are free to spend as 
much or as little time as they like picking up passengers in any given 
month.32 Though many drivers cite this flexibility as a draw, within a 
month of driving for the company 11% are inactive.33 After a year, the 
number of drivers who started the year working for Uber and remain active 
drops to roughly 70%.34 These figures tell a story not only of the retention 
rates of Uber but also of the continued instability of the larger economy, 
given that many of these drivers are using the online platform to bridge 
income gaps between other primary sources of employment.35 Moreover, 
                                                     
 29. Sec. Tom Perez, Innovation and the Contingent Workforce, DEP’T OF LAB. BLOG (Jan. 25, 
2016), https://blog.dol.gov/2016/01/25/innovation-and-contingent-workforce [https://perma.cc/ 
QH3W-6XD5]. This supplemental survey, last conducted in February 2005, seeks to capture the 
number of workers in alternative employment arrangements, such as independent contractors, on call 
workers, temporary help agency workers, and workers provided by contract firms. In its four-year 
strategic plan, released in September 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
added a new priority, focusing on “issues related to complex employment relationships and structures 
in the 21st century workplace, focusing specifically on temporary workers, staffing agencies, 
independent contractor relationships, and the on-demand economy.” U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2017–2021, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
plan/sep-2017.cfm [https://perma.cc/GBX7-8SH8]. 
 30. See Labor Market Analysis, supra note 16, at 12. It is unclear how many additional  
driver-partners purchase health insurance from a health insurance exchange or from another source. 
Id. Uber provides driver-partners with access to a service called Stride Health to help them select 
health insurance coverage that is appropriate for their situation. Almost 19,000 Uber driver-partners 
in the six eligible states have visited the Stride Health website so far. Id. 
 31. See id. at 12. 
 32. See id. at 1 n.3. “Although the requirements vary by city, before they can utilize the Uber 
platform, potential driver-partners typically must: (1) pass a background check and a review of their 
driving record; (2) submit documentation of insurance, registration, and a valid driver’s license; (3) 
successfully complete a city-knowledge test; and (4) drive a car that meets a quality inspection and is 
less than a certain number of years old.” 
 33. See id. at 16; see also Brian Solomon, The Numbers Behind Uber’s Exploding Driver Force, 
FORBES (May 1, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2015/05/01/the-numbers-behind-
ubers-exploding-driver-force/#51d4c4c84901. 
 34. See Labor Market Analysis, supra note 16, at 16. 
 35. See id. 
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Uber drivers are typically not drawn from the same pool as other workers 
in the taxi and limousine industry; they are more similar in terms of age 
and education to the general workforce than to taxi drivers and 
chauffeurs.36 
Comparing the experience of on-demand workers with that of 
independent contractors as a whole is not particularly illuminating. The 
independent contractor classification includes relatively high-income-
generating lawyers, doctors, and architects, as well as insurance agents, 
graphic design freelancers, and real estate brokers.37 Not surprisingly, the 
median annual income for independent contractors as a whole is typically 
higher than private sector wage and salary workers.38 However, there 
exists a critical subset of independent contractors who lack the educational 
background, marketable skills, and economic independence of their 
brethren. This group, which includes many landscapers, childcare 
providers, residential construction workers, and truck drivers, frequently 
endure poverty-level wages and unsafe working conditions.39 Likewise, 
while the most recent BLS survey found that 82.3% of independent 
contractors prefer their work arrangement to being an employee, it is likely 
that those who experience chronic wage and employment instability would 
prefer a more formal employment arrangement.40 
During the months in which individuals actively participated in on-
demand platforms, earnings were a sizable yet still secondary source of 
income.41 For individuals providing labor through these platforms, 
average monthly earnings were $533; for those selling or renting property, 
average monthly earnings were $314.42 If viewed as a primary source of 
income, work in the on-demand economy comes with far fewer workplace 
protections and benefits than traditional employment. This fundamental 
shift is arguably part of a larger movement away from the social contract 
established by the New Deal,43 which has led some to propose the creation 
                                                     
 36. See id. at 24. 
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 41. See BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY, supra note 12 at 24 (“In September 2015, among all 
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 42. Id. 
 43. New Deal programs, policies, and legislation enacted to mitigate intense economic 
depression helped to construct a “social contract” between the federal government, employers, and 
workers, which resulted in higher wages and more stable benefits. Josh Freedman & Michael Lind, 
The Past and Future of America’s Social Contract, ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/12/the-past-and-future-of-americas-social-
contract/282511/ [https://perma.cc/27QP-F8GQ]. Under this framework of a “social contract,” 
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of a new class of independent workers with a new “portable benefits” 
approach toward renewing and revising that broader social contract.44 
Such a system of portable benefits could, if adopted, allow individual 
workers to accrue traditionally employer-tied benefits, such as retirement, 
social security, and health insurance, across a range of intermittent or part-
time employers or gigs.45 
Workers in the on-demand economy typically experience high levels 
of income volatility.46 Estimates of the scale of the on-demand economy 
vary widely, but a recent three-year study found that an estimated 10.3 
million people—4.2% of the adult population and more than the total 
population of New York City—earned income through online platforms.47 
Interestingly, while the economy is expanding rapidly in terms of the sheer 
number of people participating (47-fold over the course of the three-year 
study), income from these platforms remained secondary for each 
individual participant.48 
For many workers looking for temporary employment or for 
employment to supplement another income, the on-demand economy 
offers a flexible and accessible on-ramp.49 In the case of Uber, workers 
need only a conforming automobile,50 insurance, and a desire to work. So 
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 44. Dana Rubinstein, Council Bill Would Provide Health Benefits for Taxi, Uber Drivers, 
POLITICO (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2016/09/city-
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competitors, and (d) provide that workers pay the taxes and provide their own tools. Josh Eidelson, 
It’s a New Game for Uber Drivers if New York Passes This Law, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-10/it-s-a-new-game-for-uber-drivers-if-new-
york-passes-this-law [https://perma.cc/CN5G-566S]. 
 45. See Sara Horowitz, Why Portable Benefits Should Be a Priority in the New Economy,  
Fast Company, FC LEADERSHIP (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3054226/the-future-
of-work/why-portable-benefits-should-be-a-priority-in-the-new-economy [https://perma.cc/69C9-
F2MM]. 
 46. See BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY, supra note 12, at 7. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Labor Market Analysis, supra note 16. 
 50. The requirement that Uber drivers have their own vehicle is also quickly changing with the 
advent of Uber’s new car leasing program, in which Uber offers drivers sub-prime auto loans and 
directly deducts payment from their earnings, leading some critics to call the program a “modern-day 
998 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:987 
long as they comply with company rules and maintain a high level of 
customer ratings, these workers can generate supplemental income with 
Uber to remedy dips in other income or to mitigate unexpected costs and 
expenses.51 In that sense, providing labor via the on-demand economy is a 
smarter financial decision than incurring additional debt. 
Correspondingly, on-demand economy participation is highest “precisely 
among those who experience the highest levels of income volatility—the 
young, the poor, and individuals living in the West.”52 
It is precisely these groups of workers—the most marginalized—
who are the focus of much of traditional labor policy in the U.S. Those 
workers who lack the education, skills, and other economic leverage with 
which to negotiate for decent wages and working conditions are, in theory, 
provided with a framework to negotiate collectively with employers as a 
means of ensuring economic security and labor peace. Though on-demand 
companies such as Uber and Lyft make persuasive arguments that the 
workers contracting through their platforms are independent contractors, 
the economic assumptions that underlie much of our employment 
relationship models are certainly not borne out by the corresponding 
economic data. As the following section demonstrates, current regulation 
of on-demand labor is based largely on these flawed assumptions. 
B. The Regulatory Landscape 
1. On-Demand Workers Classified as Independent Contractors 
The cornerstone of the organizational structure of most on-demand 
firms is the classification of its workforce as independent contractors, 
rather than as employees. The decision to structure the workplace in this 
way has immediate, as well as collateral consequences for workers, 
consumers, and the economy as a whole. Under U.S. law, employers have 
considerable incentive to classify their workers as independent contractors 
rather than as employees. Employers are required to pay employment taxes 
for employees, but not for independent contractors.53 In addition, 
employers are required to respect minimum wage and overtime standards 
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for employees, but not for independent contractors.54 Federal labor and 
employment laws impose other financial and legal obligations on 
employers, including liability for discrimination under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1963,55 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,56 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act;57 a duty to provide employees 
with unpaid leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act;58 
requirements with regard to pension plans;59 and an obligation to 
negotiate wages and working conditions with eligible employees under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).60 
Employees are covered by these laws while independent contractors 
are not for one simple reason: independent contractors are presumed to 
have the power—economically, professionally, and individually—to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of work that employees, on their own, 
typically lack. That may be true of many independent contractors—
doctors, lawyers, architects, and the like—but what happens when an Uber 
driver is injured while transporting a passenger or when a handy worker 
hurts herself assembling Ikea furniture? Should they alone bear the full 
risk of those injuries or should the online platforms shoulder some of that 
responsibility? 
The technology industry is no stranger to this issue. In Vizcaino v. 
Microsoft,61 freelance computer programmers were used to produce 
software alongside regular employees, sharing supervisors and completing 
identical assignments. The freelancers were fully integrated into the 
existing Microsoft workforce.62 While the problems related to the 
misclassification of employees as independent contractors pre-date the on-
demand economy, the classification of most on-demand workers as 
independent contractors has raised a red flag.63 On-demand workers have 
filed numerous lawsuits alleging employer misclassification, which is 
likely to increase as the economy expands.64 
Determining whether a worker should be classified as an employee 
or independent contractor is complicated. Courts assess employment 
status under each individual twig in a worker’s bundle of workplace rights, 
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 55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to2000e-17 (2004). 
 56. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
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using alternate legal tests. For example, to determine whether or not an  
on-demand worker is an employee for purposes of the NLRA, courts 
engage in a fact-based inquiry65 that focuses on the employer’s ability to 
control the worker, in particular whether or not the employer controls the 
manner and means by which the worker accomplishes the work.66 
The NLRB uses a similar test to determine employee status.67 This 
right of control test, still used today by the NLRB to determine whether a 
worker is a common law employee, relies on the medieval master–servant 
concept that an employer has a legal right to control an employee.68 
Among the factors relevant to the inquiry are: 
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the 
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion 
over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 
party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part 
of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is 
in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment 
of the hired party.69 
No one factor is decisive,70 and courts have recognized that it is rare that 
all of the factors will point decisively to one side or another.71 
While determining employee status can be murky, the effects of 
misclassifying employees as independent contractors is clear. The impacts 
of employee misclassification are most strongly felt by state and local 
governments, which lose billions of dollars of potential city payroll tax 
revenue annually.72 Moreover, local and state governments are also 
shouldering the burdens of an expanding independent contractor 
underclass, which relies disproportionately on local safety nets during 
times of income volatility. 
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Independent contractors subject to irregular work hours may need to 
rely on state financial assistance even though they are technically 
employed. For example, drivers for Uber or Lyft may freely choose the 
number of hours they work for the company; such “piece work” 
arrangements are not dispositive of employment status. In a case 
concerning workers who addressed and affixed signatures to form letters, 
the court held that they were employees—based on the degree of control 
they had over their work—even though the workers were paid on a  
per-letter basis.73 Conversely, the existence of an incentive system—most 
prevalent in employer–employee relationships—is not necessarily proof 
of employment status under the NLRA.74 As the court in FedEx Home 
Delivery v. National Labor Relations Board found, “a contractual 
willingness to share a small part of the risk—for instance . . . income for 
making a vehicle available—does not an employee make.”75 
In determining whether on-demand workers for Uber, Lyft, and the 
like are independent contractors or employees, courts also look at the 
degree to which the exercise of entrepreneurial skill by the driver will 
likely result in additional profits. A court will further consider the skill 
required to participate in the platform, how and whether drivers are 
compensated for additional duties (returning passengers’ personal items 
left behind, for example), as well as ownership and maintenance of the 
automobile and any other equipment.76 As discussed above, the exclusion 
of independent contractors from collective bargaining rights makes it 
much more difficult for on-demand workers to play an active role in 
defining the scope and conditions of labor performed within this emerging 
new economy. 
2. Wholesale Exclusion of On-Demand Employees from the NLRA 
Until litigation or legislation clarifies the status of on-demand 
workers, on-demand workers will continue to lack the right to bargain 
collectively with hiring firms. This wholesale exclusion of workers who 
are neither true independent contractors nor traditional employees is a 
dilemma first ascribed to subcontracted workers in the 1990s and early 
2000s.77 These subcontracted workers were self-employed but lacked the 
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autonomy and privileges of self-employment. Like many employees, they 
lacked the power to negotiate individually with their employer; unlike 
other employees, they lacked the legal right to bargain collectively. These 
workers were more accurately described as “dependent contractors,” a 
category of workers not originally contemplated by the framers of our 
nation’s labor and employment laws. On-demand workers now face this 
dependent contractor dilemma, as the wholesale exclusion of many  
on-demand workers from labor protections has perpetuated an imbalance 
of economic bargaining power that labor and employment laws were 
intended to redress.78 
Scholars and legal advocates have proposed various new tests for 
assigning and assessing employment status, such as whether a worker uses 
executive decision-making,79 and entire new classifications, such as the 
“independent worker.”80 However, as the National Employment Law 
Project accurately notes, a simple classification change does little to 
address the persistent problem of misclassification, and it instead suggests 
the development of a new framework oriented toward portable and 
government-sponsored benefits.81 The following section closely examines 
the most viable proposal put forth for establishing collective bargaining 
rights for on-demand workers and assesses the likelihood that it will 
survive legal challenge. 
II. STATE AND LOCAL INCUBATORS OF ON-DEMAND  
ECONOMY REGULATION 
As labor advocates have noted, the growth of the on-demand 
economy has created a critical demand for better wages and working 
conditions for its workers.82 With no real movement at the federal level, 
state and local governments have begun taking action.83 Some, such as 
New York City and Philadelphia, have actively opposed the operation and 
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expansion of on-demand businesses.84 Others have taken legislative steps 
toward affirmatively regulating the on-demand economy. These measures 
range from investigative studies85 to criminal background checks and 
fingerprinting requirements.86 Others, like Seattle, have sought to preserve 
flexibility and value for consumers while reducing economic insecurity for 
workers.87 This section examines in more detail these state- and city-based 
experiments in regulating the on-demand economy, specifically 
transportation network companies (TNCs). 
It is evident from this patchwork of state regulation that there is a 
struggle to create a new legal lexicon for ridesharing; for example, new 
concepts are defined such as “digital dispatch,” “digital network,” “digital 
platform,” “connection method,” and “prearranged rides”88 and are created 
to distinguish between a “pre-trip acceptance period” and a “trip 
acceptance period.”89 Most of statewide TNC regulation includes model 
language regarding insurance coverage favored by Uber and Lyft, while 
some of the more stringent requirements, such as fingerprinting, appear 
more frequently in municipal legislation.90 
Massachusetts is the most recent state to enact TNC legislation, 
which is most notable for its taxation structure.91 The bill levies a  
twenty-cent tax on every fare paid through a ridesharing application like 
Uber, Lyft, or any of their smaller competitors, such as Fasten.92 Five cents 
of that tax will be given to the traditional taxicab industry, ten cents will 
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go to cities and towns, and the remaining five cents will go to a statewide 
transportation fund.93 
In the case of Texas, which has yet to adopt broad regulation of 
TNCs, Uber has fought vigorously, yet unsuccessfully, to prevent or repeal 
fingerprinting requirements that it deems an unnecessary and a significant 
barrier to entry for new drivers.94 Last May, the company pulled its 
operations out of Austin, a city that passed a fingerprinting bill in 2014.95 
Uber is currently engaged in a similar standoff with Houston.96 
In Maryland, the General Assembly passed a fingerprinting 
requirement for rideshare services, but Uber and Lyft applied for, and 
recently received, waivers from the Public Service Commission, so both 
companies have agreed to remain in the state.97 Notably, Uber does not 
operate in a single U.S. municipality that requires fingerprinting, other 
than New York City, whose market for taxicab services has proved too 
great for the company to walk away from.98 
A. Class Action Litigation over Employment Status 
State unemployment agencies and local labor commissions are 
increasingly tasked with determining the employment status of on-demand 
workers for the purpose of unemployment benefits or wage and hour 
standards enforcement. In May 2015, the Florida Department of Economic 
Opportunity found that Uber driver, Darrin McGillis, was an employee of 
Uber, and thus eligible for unemployment insurance.99 The following 
month, the California Labor Commission, which investigates wage claims, 
also found that one of Uber’s drivers was an employee and thus entitled to 
reimbursement for certain expenses incurred while driving for the 
company.100 The Commission also found that in another case involving 
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Uber, the driver was an employee and thus eligible for unemployment 
insurance.101 
The decisions in these individual cases appeared only to bolster 
claims made in larger Uber and Lyft class action lawsuits. In 2013, drivers 
for Uber filed a class action lawsuit alleging misclassification as 
independent contractors and demanding reimbursement for expenses like 
gas and vehicle maintenance.102 The lawsuit also took on Uber’s policy of 
marketing the service to customers as “gratuity-included,” when no such 
tip is ever provided to the driver.103 Uber immediately filed a motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that the drivers were independent contractors 
as a matter of law and thus not entitled to expenses or tips.104 On March 
11, 2015, Judge Edward M. Chen of the Federal District Court in San 
Francisco denied Uber’s motion and signaled that he was inclined to view 
the drivers as employees.105 The court concluded that the drivers “are 
Uber’s presumptive employees because they ‘perform services’ for the 
benefit of Uber,” and reaffirmed that under California law, the question of 
whether an individual should be classified as an employee or independent 
contractor is a mixed question of law and fact that must be determined by 
a fact finder.106 
While the decision rested on well-established principles of California 
law, it was notable for shedding light on the very specific ways in which 
work is organized by Uber, a leader in the on-demand economy. The 
plaintiff, Douglas O’Connor, worked for two different limo companies in 
the Bay Area, each of which gave him access to the type of “black car” 
necessary for Uber’s “UberBlack” service.107 Depending on the 
intermediary, O’Connor either paid the company a flat fee for use of the 
car or agreed to turn over up to 60% of the wages he earned.108 
Uber’s argument that it is a “technology company” that owns no 
vehicles and employs no drivers was deemed “fatally flawed” by the court, 
which also noted that Uber owns a U.S. trademark on “Everyone’s Private 
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Driver,” and has previously referred to itself as an “On-Demand Car 
Service.”109 As the court observed, “Uber simply would not be a viable 
business entity without its drivers.”110 For a technology company, its CEO 
appears to have been hoisted by his own technological petard when the 
court gave weight to his comments on the official Uber blog, which stated 
that the company was “rolling out a transportation system in a city near 
you.”111 
The court also found much to criticize in Uber’s insistence that it 
exercises minimal control over how its “transportation providers” (which 
it contends are independent contractors and not employees) actually 
provide services to customers.112 While the court ultimately left the 
determination for a jury, Judge Chen signaled that the company would 
have to overcome the factual indicia of employment that plaintiffs had 
presented.113 For example, the court noted that Uber regularly terminates 
the accounts of drivers who do not perform up to its standards—one of the 
chief complaints of drivers seeking workplace protection in the form of a 
labor union.114 
The court reserved its greatest derision for Uber’s claim that it 
exerted little to no control over its “partners,” which was the fundamental 
basis of its argument that its drivers should be considered independent 
contractors and not employees.115 The court plucked out specific 
requirements that the company indicated for its drivers including that 
drivers dress professionally, text the passenger one to two minutes prior to 
pick-up, open the door for the client, and “make sure the radio is off or on 
soft jazz or NPR.”116 Though Uber argued that all of these details were 
mere suggestions for its drivers, the plaintiffs were able to present 
compelling evidence that the company not only actively monitors 
compliance with these “suggestions,” but that drivers are frequently 
admonished or even deactivated for failing to comply.117 
Importantly, the evidence presented in the O’Connor Case shed light 
on the role that technology is likely playing throughout many workplaces 
in the U.S. Though ostensibly alone, and arguably “unsupervised,” today’s 
Uber driver is in many ways more closely monitored than any traditional 
                                                     
 109. Id. at 4, 10–11. The decision deemed Uber’s self-definition as a technology company 
“unduly narrow” in its focus on the technological underpinnings of the platform, rather than the reality 
that the technology is merely a tool connecting drivers with riders. 
 110. Id. at 11. 
 111. Id. at 5. 
 112. Id. at 3. 
 113. Id. at 6. 
 114. Id. at 12. 
 115. Id. at 25. 
 116. Id. at 21. 
 117. Id. at 22–23. 
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line worker could have possibly been observed by any foreman. Recalling 
the 1990s Hair Club for Men advertisements—in which the company’s 
CEO revealed, “I’m not just the President, I’m also a client!”—today’s 
Uber customers are not only the company’s client, they are its managers 
and HR directors, providing pervasive micro-feedback in the form of 
driver ratings that far exceeds the level of supervision experienced by most 
traditional employees.118 
Following defeat on its motion for summary judgment, Uber 
continued to argue that the case should not be heard in federal court based 
on the mandatory arbitration clause in the Partner Agreement that drivers 
agreed to.119 The court held that Uber’s arbitration clause was 
unenforceable, issued its final order certifying the drivers as a class action 
lawsuit, and set a trial date of June 20, 2016.120 However, on April 5th, the 
Ninth Circuit granted Uber’s request for an immediate appeal of the 
district court’s ruling that Uber’s arbitration clause was unenforceable.121 
With the possibility of decertification as a class, as well as an ultimate 
finding that the drivers were employees, the plaintiffs and Uber agreed to 
a $100 million settlement of the misclassification claims.122 Pursuant to 
the agreement, Uber agreed to policy changes, including: 
                                                     
 118. Comparing the level of monitoring in O’Connor to the level of monitoring in Alexander v. 
FedEx, the Court found that while the quarterly “ride-alongs” required for FedEx drivers were 
sufficient to find that the drivers were employees as a matter of law, the evidence presented in 
O’Connor regarding app-based monitoring arguably exceeded the amount of control in Alexander. 
While it left the determination to a jury, the Court cited Michel Foucalt and found that “a reasonable 
jury could conclude that Uber’s more persistent performance monitoring . . . weighs in favor of finding 
that Uber drivers are Uber’s employees [as a matter of law].” Id. at 24. 
 119. Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. 346 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2015). 
 120. Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. 460 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016). While Uber’s attempts to compel mandatory arbitration 
were stymied by the New York district court (See, e.g., Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 99921 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (holding that Uber failed to provide sufficient notice to 
the plaintiff for the mandatory arbitration process to be legally binding)), the company finally found a 
sympathetic judicial ear in September 2016, when the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in San 
Francisco reversed the California district court’s earlier ruling that the arbitration agreements signed 
by Uber drivers were unenforceable. In that case, the 9th Circuit found that drivers who began working 
for Uber in 2013 and 2014 must pursue their claims using arbitration, which affected some members 
of the class action. While the plaintiffs later submitted a separate argument to the court that the 
arbitration agreements were unenforceable as they violate workers’ National Labor Relations Act’s 
Section 7 right to engage in concerted activity, the 9th Circuit ruled that the submission of those 
arguments was untimely, and the panel denied rehearing en banc. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 836 
F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2016) (2016 WL 7470557). 
 121. Tracey Lien, Court Lets Uber Appeal a Class-Action Lawsuit Filed by its Drivers, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-0406-uber-lawsuit-
20160405-story.html [https://perma.cc/T67Y-3AC2]. 
 122. Tracey Lien, Uber Will Pay up to $100 Million to Settle Suits with Drivers Seeking 
Employee Status, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-
0422-uber-settlement-story.html [https://perma.cc/JN3C-7S98]. 
1008 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:987 
 Uber will recognize a Driver Association and engage in good 
faith discussion (on a quarterly basis) of issues of driver 
concern;123 
 Uber will no longer be able to deactivate drivers at will—drivers 
may only be terminated for just cause (which will not include 
low acceptance rates);124 and 
 Drivers will be permitted to place signs in their cars notifying 
passengers that tips are not included, and are appreciated.125 
 
The settlement agreement, which was ultimately rejected by the 
federal district court as “not fair, adequate and reasonable,” would have 
covered 385,000 drivers in California and Massachusetts and was 
followed by the announcement of a formation of an Independent Drivers 
Guild (the Guild) in New York City.126 The Guild was organized by the 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,  
AFL-CIO (IAM), a union that already represented so-called “black car” 
taxi and limousine drivers.127 The formation of the Guild sidesteps the 
issue of employee classification entirely, presuming that the drivers are 
independent contractors and creating an organizational structure outside 
of the NLRA.128 While membership in the Guild does not confer any 
                                                     
 123. Growing and Growing Up, UBER NEWSROOM (Apr. 21, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/ 
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 124. Lien, supra note 122. 
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 126. Mike Isaac, Judge Overturns Uber’s Settlement with Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), 
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10, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-agrees-to-work-with-a-guild-for-its-drivers-in-new-
york-city-1462913669. 
 127. AFL-CIO organized so called “black car drivers” at Elite Limousine in the mid-1990s, 
resulting in a landmark NLRB decision granting independent drivers the right to organize and form 
unions for purposes of collective bargaining. See Steven Greenhouse, Government Ruling Paves Way 
for Limousine Drivers’ Union, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/26/ 
nyregion/government-ruling-paves-way-for-limousine-drivers-union.html [https://perma.cc/Z853-
LJQQ]. 
 128. Advocates for drivers in New York City are not unanimously in support of the guild 
approach. On June 2, 2016, the Taxi Workers Alliance, a long-time advocacy group for independent 
cab drivers in New York City, claimed misclassification and a violation of wage and overtime law. 
Bharavi Desai, the Alliance’s executive director, expressed frustration with the IAM approach—which 
conceded for the moment that Uber drivers should be considered independent contractors—and stated 
a desire for the Alliance to someday win a union representation election for Uber drivers in New York. 
Steven Greenhouse, On Demand, and Demanding Their Rights: Gig Workers in the Uber Economy 
Are Organizing to Win More Say Over Their Jobs—And Writing A New Chapter in American Labor 
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enforceable collective bargaining rights, Uber has stated a commitment to 
conduct regular public forums where drivers may communicate workplace 
issues directly to its management.129 The IAM also promises to provide 
deactivation protection through representation before independent panels 
of highly rated drivers.130 Membership will also make drivers eligible for 
certain automobile insurance discounts and roadside assistance programs, 
which are currently available to IAM black car drivers.131 A similar guild 
is being considered by Uber drivers in Philadelphia,132 though the fact that 
company-sanctioned organizations are also partially company-funded 
raises concerns that the guild is more like a nineteenth century company 
union than a modern-day vehicle for worker power.133 
Uber remains a “moving target” for independent contractor class 
action litigation.134 In response, state legislation has tried to head off 
litigation by constructing regulatory frameworks in favor of independent 
contractor status. For example, West Virginia’s 2016 law provides that 
drivers are independent contractors and not employees of the 
transportation network company so long as (1) the company does not 
proscribe the driver’s hours; (2) the company does not restrict a driver’s 
right to work for a competitor rideshare company; (3) the company does 
not assign a driver a particular geographic area; (4) the company does not 
restrict a driver’s ability to work in any other occupation or business; and 
(5) the company and driver agree in writing that the driver is an 
independent contractor of the company.135 States with default independent 
                                                     
History, AM. PROSPECT (June 28, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/demand-and-demanding-their-
rights [https://perma.cc/99WE-RYMR]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Travis M. Andrews, Uber Settles Groundbreaking Labor Dispute for up to $100 Million 
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 132. Jason Laughlin, Uber Drivers Consider Guild Representation, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug.  
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 133. Greenhouse, supra note 128. 
 134. See, e.g., Complaint, Scroggins v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-1419 (S.D. Ind. June 9, 
2016). 
 135. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-29-11 (West 2016) (limitation on transportation network 
companies). 
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contractor classification provisions include Arkansas,136 Indiana,137 and 
North Carolina.138 
B. The Seattle Experiment 
Rather than waiting for the courts to remedy the disparity in 
bargaining power experienced by workers in the on-demand economy, the 
Seattle City Council took a more direct approach. In its first attempt at 
regulation, the city tried to limit the number of licensed drivers for TNCs 
like Uber and Lyft, but the measure was defeated largely by Uber 
consumer backlash.139 At that point, public sentiment toward TNCs was 
that they provided a much-needed service outside of the “rigid regulations 
imposed on the taxi industry.”140 However, that sentiment began to shift 
as Uber slashed driver reimbursement rates from $2 per mile to about 
$1.20 per mile, and as workers began organizing and drawing attention to 
“limited pay, long hours, and arbitrary deactivation.”141 
Instead of “tinkering around the edges with new regulations,” city 
council member Mike O’Brien drafted legislation that would allow the 
drivers to unionize and negotiate the terms and conditions of their labor 
directly with the TNCs, with the City of Seattle acting as an 
intermediary.142 Finding that driving for companies like Uber and Lyft 
“can be a viable path to steady, reliable and regular work for historically 
disadvantaged communities, including new immigrants to the United 
States” and that collective bargaining with those companies will directly 
“better ensure that they can perform their services in a safe, reliable, stable, 
cost-effective and economically viable manner,” the council passed the 
groundbreaking ordinance in December 2015.143 With support from the 
Teamsters local 117 union, drivers for Uber and Lyft organized the App-
                                                     
 136. S.B. 800, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ 
assembly/2015/2015R/Bills/SB800.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW6A-F4RY]. 
 137. HB 1278, 119th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015), https://iga.in.gov/legislative/ 
2015/bills/house/1278 [https://perma.cc/7T2T-B8G2]. 
 138. SB 541, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session (N.C. 2015), http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/ 
2015/Bills/Senate/PDF/S541v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFC5-GX9E]. 
 139. Davey Alba, Inside Seattle’s Bold Plan to Let Its Uber Drivers Organize, WIRED (Dec.  
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Code; adding Section 6.310.735 to the Seattle Municipal Code; and authorizing the election of driver 
representatives). 
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Based Drivers Association using traditional organizing techniques in a 
nontraditional economy.144 Eleven months after the ordinance became law, 
the City of Seattle’s Finance and Administrative Services Department 
(FAS) proposed rules clarifying, among other things, which drivers will 
be eligible to vote on unionization.145 
Seattle’s power to regulate working conditions in the on-demand 
economy stems not from any delegation of federal authority to the states 
but rather from the state’s own reserved police powers in the Tenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.146 Seattle saw itself as 
uniquely positioned to address the impacts that independent contractor 
classification has on its local workforce and consumer base. In addition to 
their interest in lost payroll tax revenues, local governments often serve as 
social safety nets when traditional employment benefitssuch as 
healthcare, insurance, and retirement savingsare withheld by companies 
classifying their workers as independent contractors. However, consumer 
support for ride-hailing companies like Uber does not mean that Seattle 
taxpayers are not sympathetic to the idea that the workers providing those 
rides should be treated and compensated fairly. Rather than wait for the 
rideshare industry to raise standards voluntarily or for the federal 
government to mandate standards, Seattle looked to its existing regulatory 
tools and then innovated. 
Under Chapter 6.310 of the Seattle Municipal Code (SMC), Seattle 
has the “power to license for-hire vehicles, taxicabs, for-hire drivers, 
taxicab associations, and transportation network companies, and issue 
TNC vehicle endorsements, for regulations and revenue.”147 The 
underlying regulatory purpose of this chapter of the SMC is to “increase 
the safety, reliability, cost-effectiveness, and the economic viability and 
stability of privately-operated-for-hire vehicle and taxicab services within 
The City of Seattle.”148 The ordinance’s text criticizes on-demand business 
                                                     
 144. App-Based Drivers Association, TEAMSTERSTNC, http://www.teamstertnc.org/ 
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 148. Id. The ordinance further states that its purpose is  
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models that classify drivers as independent contractors, which the Council 
argues “render for-hire drivers exempt from minimum labor requirements 
that the City of Seattle has deemed in the interest of public health and 
welfare, and undermine Seattle’s efforts to create opportunities for all 
workers in Seattle to earn a living wage.”149 
Implementation of the Seattle ordinance was initially delayed. After 
a reportedly “rowdy public comment period,” the Seattle City Council’s 
Education, Equity and Governance Committee announced that it would 
take another six months to work out the details of the election and 
representation process.150 The first set of rules were published and made 
effective in December of 2016, with the remainder of rules to be released 
in the first quarter of 2017. 
Pursuant to the first of these finalized rules promulgated in 
connection with the Seattle ordinance, drivers who contracted with a 
Driver Coordinator151 (e.g., Uber, Lyft) at least ninety days prior to 
January 17, 2017, and who made at least fifty-two trips within the Seattle 
city limits for that particular Driver Coordinator will be eligible for 
collective representation.152 This definition was deemed too narrow by 
rideshare companies like Uber and Lyft, who lobbied to allow every 
driver—including those who drove intermittently or infrequently—to be 
eligible to vote.153 Uber sued the FAS on the grounds that the rulemaking 
                                                     
regulate for hire transportation pursuant to RCW 46.76.001, which states: ‘The legislature 
finds and declares that privately operated for hire transportation service is a vital part of 
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federal antitrust laws.’ RCW 81.72.200 governing taxicab transportation has a similar 
statement of legislative intent. 
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 152. Rule FHDR-1 Qualifying Driver and Lists of Qualifying Drivers (SMC 6.310.110 and .735), 
SEATTLE.GOV (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/FAS/ 
RegulatoryServices/collective-bargaining/FHDR-1-qualifying-driver-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
T5YL-NFNF]. 
 153. Beekman, supra note 145. 
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process was arbitrary and capricious and that the rules themselves violate 
well settled principles of labor law.154 
For their part, Mike O’Brien nor the labor unions were satisfied with 
the finalized rules, which represented a significant departure from the 
originally proposed eligibility standard of 150 trips within a thirty-day 
period.155 The requirements for a labor union, or another advocacy 
organization, to be considered a qualified driver representative (QDR) 
remained unchanged; it must be a democratically organized not-for-profit 
organization with “experience in . . . assisting stakeholders in reaching 
consensus agreements with, or related to, employers and contractors.”156 
Pursuant to the finalized rules, Seattle will certify a QDR as the exclusive 
bargaining representative if it can demonstrate that a majority of eligible 
drivers expressed interest in being represented by that organization.157 
III. VIABILITY OF SEATTLE ORDINANCE 
A little over two months after Seattle enacted its landmark collective 
bargaining ordinance, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, on behalf of the 
industry, filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the law.158 The lawsuit 
made two predictable claims. First, it claimed that the NLRA restricts 
collective bargaining rights to employees and therefore preempts local and 
state governments like Seattle from enacting parallel or conflicting laws.159 
Second, it claimed that the ordinance violates the federal Sherman 
Antitrust Act, which prohibits anticompetitive behavior.160 While the 
Sherman Act exempts from liability employees who negotiate as a union 
for higher wages, a court may view the same negotiations, when conducted 
by independent contractors, as “price-fixing.”161 
Because the purpose of laws like the Seattle ordinance is to alleviate 
workers’ economic inequality through freedom of association and to 
protect consumers against abuses by large-scale monopolies, it is unlikely 
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that Congress intended to bar initiatives like Seattle’s (which seeks to 
reduce such inequality). On August 9, 2016, U.S. District Judge Robert 
Lasnik ruled that the Chamber of Commerce’s members lacked standing 
to pursue the lawsuit because they didn’t show that they were or would be 
harmed by the ordinance.162 Judge Lasnik granted Seattle’s motion to 
dismiss without prejudice, leaving the door open for the Chamber, or one 
of the rideshare companies themselves, to bring suit in the future.163 
The Chamber stated that Seattle merely “delayed coming to grips 
with the legal flaws at the heart of this ordinance” and asserted that Judge 
Lasnik “made clear at oral argument that he stands ready to hear a 
challenge to Seattle’s unprecedented ordinance in the future.”164Though 
the first attempt to legally block the ordinance’s implementation was 
unsuccessful, an in-depth analysis of federal preemption and antitrust law 
is necessary to determine whether this type of state regulation can survive 
future legal challenge. 
A. Federal Preemption Claims 
Any regulation of work in an on-demand economy is going to raise 
the red flag of federal labor preemption. Councilman O’Brien believes that 
cities have a “powerful role” in ensuring that the benefits to consumers 
created by the on-demand economy do not come at the expense of worker 
dignity.165 Given the current lack of leadership on this issue at the federal 
level, may local governments regulate labor relations between on-demand 
workers and firms without running afoul of federal preemption 
challenges? A thorough analysis of the preemption arguments and 
available defenses strongly suggests that such a role is possible. 
Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution (referred to as the 
“Supremacy Clause”) states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
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thereby, any Thing [sic] in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.166 
State and local laws are preempted when there is a clear 
manifestation of congressional intent to occupy the field and supersede 
local attempts to regulate that field.167 Highways and railroads are good 
examples of areas in which the federal government exercises almost 
exclusive authority. Labor law preemption, however, is limited by 
deference to state regulation.168 While the NLRB’s broad powers to 
interpret and enforce federal labor laws often prohibit or promote 
conflicting rules of law, courts have recognized situations where state 
regulation is not preempted.169 These are situations involving local 
regulations that touch and concern the complex employment 
relationship.170 
The critical rights extended to workers under Sections 7 and 8 of the 
NLRA apply only to those classified as “employees” under the statute.171 
For example, individuals employed “in the domestic service of any family 
or person at his home” are excluded from the definition of “employee” 
under 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).172 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the exclusion 
of such workers in Harris v. Quinn, referring to Illinois’ homecare 
providers as “personal assistants” and holding that they are not covered by 
the NLRA.173 
However, the NLRA itself contains no specific statutory  
preemption provision. Thus, “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone.”174 In cases where federal law does not explicitly bar state and 
local attempts to regulate in a particular area, courts will uphold the local 
regulation “unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the 
federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the 
circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of 
the States.”175 
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The Supreme Court, in one of the earliest (and only) cases to extend 
NLRA protection to independent contractors, did so in recognition of the 
economic forces at play between the employer and putative employees.176 
In that case, the Court relied on the NLRA’s legislative history, which 
demonstrated a congressional commitment to broadening the narrow 
“master and servant” legal definition.177 In response to the decision, 
Senator Taft scolded the Supreme Court for relying on an evaluation of 
“social interests,” rather than the legal definition, to extend NLRA 
protection to newsboys.178 In support of what would become the  
Taft–Hartley amendments to the NLRA, Taft explained, 
An ‘employee’ . . . means someone who works for another for 
hire. . . . In the law, there always has been a difference, and a big 
difference, between ‘employees’ and ‘independent contractors.’ 
‘Employees’ work for wages or salaries under direct supervision. 
‘Independent contractors’ undertake to do a job for a price, decide 
how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the work, and 
depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the difference 
between what they pay for goods, materials, and labor and what they 
receive for the end result, that is, upon profits.179 
Even if states determined that on-demand workers are not traditional 
“employees,” states still arguably have an interest in regulating the 
contractual relationship created between on-demand companies and their 
workers for reasons outside the scope of the NLRA. A closer examination 
of the economic and social goals of worker equality underpinning the 
NLRA, as well as the nature of the federal preemption doctrine, is required 
to support the proposition that the Seattle ordinance should not be 
preempted. 
In determining whether a state law is preempted by the NLRA, 
an analytical distinction must be made between preemption based on 
federal protection of the conduct in question and preemption based on the 
NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction.180 The Supreme Court has identified three 
scenarios in which state action is preempted by the NLRA, and the cases 
that arise under each scenario are understood to implicate the preemption 
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doctrine as established under Garmon, Machinists, or Section 301.181 The 
first category consists of cases in which the activity involved is arguably 
protected as an employee right under NLRA Section 7 or is prohibited as 
an unfair labor practice under NLRA Section 8. In the landmark case 
establishing the framework for analyzing cases that trigger this type of 
preemption, the San Diego Building Trades Council was engaged in 
“peaceful picketing” for the purpose of seeking employer recognition of 
(and collective bargaining with) the union.182 The employer sought relief 
under state law, and the union argued that picketing was a protected NLRA 
Section 7 activity.183 The Supreme Court ruled that whether the conduct 
was protected or prohibited was ultimately an issue for the federal National 
Labor Relations Board, not a state court.184 The Court explained that were 
it to allow state laws or state remedies to prevail in instances where the 
activity in question was “arguably subject” to Sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA, 
it would risk interfering with a uniform national labor policy.185 The 
contemporary justification for Garmon preemption is the concern that the 
existence of parallel state regulation could result in states prohibiting 
conduct that the NLRA protects.186 In those cases, the NLRB and the courts 
have held that there is no room for parallel state regulation.187 
The second category of cases in which the Court has found that 
the NLRA preempts state regulation is those in which the NLRB clearly 
has jurisdiction over an activity but chooses not to exercise it.188 If, for 
example, the NLRB were to decline to issue a complaint against an 
employer because the labor relations involved were local in nature, it 
may nevertheless not cede jurisdiction to the state labor board. In that case, 
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a parallel claim filed in state court would be preempted by the NLRA, 
even though its own administrative forum denied review.189 
In the third category of cases, the NLRA neither protects nor 
prohibits the activity in question, but national labor policy requires that 
the activity be left free from regulation, subject only to economic forces. 
In Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the Court 
held that a union’s concerted refusal to work overtime was peaceful 
conduct and constituted an activity that must be kept free of state 
regulation if the comprehensive goals of the NLRA were not to be 
frustrated.190 
Professor Gottesman has argued persuasively that the goals of the 
NLRA should prevail over strict doctrinal interpretation.191 Given the clear 
intention of Congress in passing the Wagner Act to alleviate workers’ 
economic inequality through collective bargaining, it is difficult to 
imagine that it would object to local laws that accomplish the goal of 
federal law.192 As the Supreme Court noted in another context, “some 
preemption rulings insulating employers from state regulation would 
‘turn . . . the Wagner Act on its head.’”193 
Courts have repeatedly addressed the issue of workers not covered 
under the NLRA but who are nevertheless seeking collective bargaining 
rights. In a case involving agricultural workers, the court found that, “there 
is no legislative history to indicate that the NLRA’s exclusion of 
agricultural laborers from its coverage was intended to leave the area 
totally free from regulation.”194 In that case, the court held that the NLRA 
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would not (on Machinist preemption grounds) preempt the State of 
Minnesota’s regulation of labor relations among agricultural workers.195 
Similarly, in 2001, Washington State passed a state initiative 
establishing a public employer of record and creating certain collective 
bargaining rights for adult family home care providers, who would 
otherwise face total exclusion as domestic workers under the NLRA.196 
Following a successful series of similar laws establishing state 
governments as the public employer of privately contracted care providers 
in other states (including Illinois197 and California), the Washington law 
extended to direct care workers the right to bargain collectively over “(i) 
[e]conomic compensation, such as manner and rate of subsidy and 
reimbursement, including tiered reimbursements; (ii) health and  
welfare benefits; (iii) professional development and training; (iv)  
labor-management committees; (v) grievance procedures; and (vi) other 
economic matters.”198 
The purpose of applying Garmon preemption to local laws are to 
protect the authority of the NLRB and to establish a uniform system of 
laws and remedies for all conduct by employers and employees that is 
arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. In other words, such 
preemption is applied to avoid the much maligned patchwork of legal 
protections that could develop if no such uniformity were enforced. On the 
other hand, the Machinist preemption operates more like a system of 
national parksunregulated tracts of land, or in this case, certain conduct 
and speech, that is to be left unregulated by anything other than the 
interplay of economic forces. 
Court precedent has established that Congress did not intend to leave 
the areas of domestic services and agricultural labor entirely free from 
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regulation.199 As noted above, courts have held that the exclusion of 
agricultural workers under 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) did not preempt state 
regulation of such workers’ labor relations.200 Washington State Attorney 
General Rob McKenna, in considering whether the NLRA would preempt 
a Washington state bill to prohibit employers from requiring employees to 
attend “captive audience meetings,” concluded that the bill would be 
preempted by the NLRA, for two independent reasons:201 
First, the bill proposes a state prohibition and sanction for employer 
actions that arguably are already prohibited by the NLRA in some 
circumstances. Second, the provisions of SSB 5446 could be applied 
to limit the type of employer speech regarding union organization that 
Congress intended to be controlled by the free play of economic 
forces and reserved for market freedom.202 
The exclusion of on-demand workers from traditional employment 
laws is felt most at the state level in the form of lost payroll and other 
taxes.203 States must nevertheless shoulder the burden of providing social 
services to marginalized groups of demand economy workers.204 
Furthermore, local industries such as taxi and limousine services involve 
consumer and public safety concerns, giving states an interest and arguable 
authority over those workers. 
The City of San Jose invoked such an interest when it executed a 
labor peace agreement between owner–operator taxicab drivers and two 
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taxicab corporations in connection with the operation of its airport.205 
The agreement included mechanisms for dispute resolution between 
drivers and taxi companies, such as the right of drivers to outside 
representation in disciplinary hearings; reporting requirements by the 
taxi companies; a prohibition on discrimination against drivers for 
union activity or other collective action; and a liquidated damages clause 
for breach of the agreement. Today, the San Jose airport is considering 
allowing Uber and Lyft to pick up passengers alongside taxi drivers 
subject to the agreement.206 
The exclusion of on-demand workers from the National Labor 
Relations Act is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Act and is 
an omission best corrected at the federal level. Given the unlikelihood that 
such change will take place federally, employers should not be permitted 
to wield the Constitution in ways that preempt experimentation by state 
and local governments. Given the absence of any federal regulation, 
prohibition, or direction in the field, state legislative solutions to the  
on-demand dilemma should not be preempted by existing federal law. 
B. Antitrust Claims 
“[I]t’s antitrust 101 that independent actors cannot conspire with 
each other to set prices.”207 
While measures by state and local governments to extend collective 
bargaining rights to independent contractors may survive preemption 
challenges, they must also overcome opponents’ arguments that they 
violate antitrust law. Early American history is replete with cases of 
employers misusing antitrust law to defeat union organizing. Beginning in 
1806, when a Philadelphia court ruled that the creation of a shoemaker 
guild would “disrupt market competition,” courts relied on common law 
principles (and anti-union hostility) to find workers and unions guilty of 
“criminal conspiracy.”208 However, as described in more detail below, a 
careful examination of antitrust precedent and policy reveals ample bases 
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for exemptions from antitrust liability, such as in the case of the Seattle 
ordinance.  
One of the principal applications of antitrust law is to preclude 
horizontal restraints that limit competition among economic entities. One 
example of a horizontal restraint is price fixing within an industry. The 
Seattle ordinance embodies the inherent tension between antitrust policy, 
which is designed to maximize individual competition, and national labor 
policy, which is designed to promote cooperation between workers in the 
face of employer economic power.209 On-demand workers who are 
viewed as independent contractors lack the legal status to bargain 
collectively under labor law. Strikes and other concerted action in support 
of increased compensation—the “accoutrements of industrial strife”210—can 
arguably constitute unlawful horizontal restraints of trade. In addition, 
collectively negotiating over pay rates could arguably constitute illegal 
price fixing—a per se violation of antitrust law.211 On-demand workers 
themselves could be held liable for violations of state and federal antitrust 
law. Yet, if viewed as individual businessmen, they are prisoners of the 
regime of competition and lack any means of attaining more equal 
bargaining power in negotiating the terms of their employment. 
A careful consideration of the specific antitrust provisions, as well as 
exemptions from liability, is therefore necessary to determine whether or 
not collective bargaining among on-demand workers classified as 
independent contractors will trigger antitrust liability. 
1. Federal Antitrust Law 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes unlawful “every 
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states.”212 However, Section 6 of the Clayton Act 
affirms that human labor is not a commodity or article of commerce.213 
In addition, it immunizes labor organizations and their members that 
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lawfully carry out legitimate objectives of antitrust liability.214 The 
Clayton Act makes clear that antitrust laws are not to be used to nullify 
the existence of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations created 
with the goal of mutual aid.215 Thus, certain activities, such as strikes and 
boycotts, which if undertaken by independent businesses would violate 
antitrust law, are permitted by employees when undertaken in their own 
self-interest and in the course of disputes regarding the terms and 
conditions of work. 
Independent contractors are typically excluded from this labor 
immunity under the Sherman Act, a general rule the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly affirmed. In 1962, the Court held in United States v. L.A. Meat 
and Provision Drivers Union that allowing independent contractors who 
collected and sold waste restaurant grease to be union members violated 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.216 Seeking to increase the margin between 
the prices, the grease peddlers paid restaurants for leftover grease and the 
prices at which they resold the grease to local processors, most of the 
Los Angeles area peddlers became members of the union Local 626.217 
With the help of the union’s business agent, the peddlers fixed purchase 
and sale prices citywide.218 The union enforced the new standards by 
threatening processors with strikes and boycotts if they chose to purchase 
grease from non-union peddlers.219 
The California District Court held that the peddlers could not escape 
the reach of antitrust law simply by becoming members of a union.220 
The actions of the peddlers, as independent contractors, constituted an 
unlawful restraint on trade, and the district court ordered the peddlers to 
withdraw their union membership.221 The judgment was affirmed on 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.222 In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Goldberg noted that it was not insignificant that the peddlers described 
themselves as “independent businessmen” rather than employees of the 
processors.223 While the terminology that an employee (or employer) uses 
is not itself dispositive, in this case it was reflective of the actual 
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independence experienced by the peddlers. The tactics employed by the 
peddlers were more akin to business strategy than genuine labor dispute.224 
Concerted action in a commercial context recalls the unbridled 
power of large trusts and monopolies, ruthlessly wielded against 
individuals and small businesses. In the Uber driver context, however, 
that unchecked power lies more realistically with the online platform 
itself. While it may indeed be elementary antitrust law that independent 
contractors cannot engage in price fixing, a more advanced set of legal 
principles and judicial decisions makes clear that the Court is willing to 
exempt independent contractors from antitrust liability when doing so 
advances the goals of antitrust and labor law.225 
2. Labor Unions’ Antitrust Liability 
The Clayton Act exempts labor unions’ collective demands for 
improved wages and working conditions from antitrust liability.226 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that unions can organize or 
regulate the activities of independent contractors if there is: (1) wage or 
job competition between independent contractors and employees 
represented by a union (e.g., competition between employee milk wagon 
drivers and self-employed milk vendors);227 or (2) some other economic 
interrelationship between independent contractors and union-represented 
employees that has an impact on employee wages, etc. (e.g., musicians 
and orchestra leaders, actors and theatrical agents).228 If the members of 
a union are independent contractors rather than a group of employees, 
then what was negotiated as a closed shop labor agreement becomes a 
union conspiracy to restrain competition. Such conduct “falls back into 
being the type of conspiracy which it would be without its labor 
agreement mantle.”229 In order for a union to shield itself from antitrust 
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liability for organizing dependent contractors, it must pay strict attention 
to the rules laid down by the Supreme Court.230 
In the grease peddlers’ case, the district court concluded that while 
the peddlers had violated antitrust law, their membership in the union 
would not violate the Sherman Act so long as two conditions were met.231 
First, the peddlers had to be engaged in the same kind of work as existing 
union members, and second, they had to compete with those 
members.232 The court reasoned that competition with employees could 
lower the working standards and wages of the union members if the 
grease peddlers were excluded from collective bargaining.233 The district 
court relied on Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local v. Wohl,234 
in which the Supreme Court sanctioned the joining of independent 
contractors with employees, so long as the independent contractors 
competed with union members by doing the same or similar work.235 
Using this two-pronged test, the district court concluded that the grease 
peddlers satisfied neither requirement.236 
Independent contractors may be members of a union only when 
the purpose of their membership is to eliminate unfair competition 
between themselves and regular employees in order to obtain better 
wages and working conditions for all union members.237 In New York 
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Teamsters believed that the vendor system was a scheme to escape payment of union wages, 
rendering the picketing a “labor dispute” on its face. Id. at 98. “To say . . . that the conflict here is 
not a good faith labor issue . . . is to shut one’s eyes to the everyday elements of industrial strife.” 
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City, black car drivers compete directly with Uber, providing a basis for 
black car (employee) unions to organize workers into their locals, as the 
International Association of Machinists (IAM) has done.238 Likewise, the 
Teamsters union in Seattle is affiliated with the Western Washington 
Taxicab Operators Association, which “promotes fairness, justice, and 
transparency in Seattle’s heavily regulated taxi industry.”239 
Other cases in which antitrust law is triggered in dealings between 
labor unions and independent contractors are in the context of licensing 
systems. For example, the Actors Equity Association requires as a 
condition of union membership that Equity members contract only with 
licensed Equity theater agents.240 This requirement was initially 
challenged during the Great Depression on grounds of common law 
tortious interference with business relationships.241 The challenge failed 
but was reincarnated as an antitrust claim fifty years later, charging that 
the regulation violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.242 The 
district court held that Equity’s licensing system was fully protected by 
the statutory labor exemptions under antitrust laws and thus dismissed 
the agents’ complaint.243 Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision on appeal.244 
If “job or wage competition or some other economic 
interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests exists between union 
members and independent contractors,” then independent contractors are 
a “labor group” and party to a “labor dispute” immune from antitrust laws 
under the Norris–LaGuardia Act.245 The Court in Carroll confirmed that 
the “allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted to an 
immediate employer–employee relation.”246 Therefore, groups of on-
demand workers that either compete with, or are economically related 
to a bona fide union of employees, may organize with those employees 
and still merit an exemption from federal antitrust law. 
We can imagine a scenario in which on-demand workers organize 
themselves to agree to only work with licensed online platforms. However, 
                                                     
Id. at 99. The Court found it immaterial that the Teamsters tried to condition vendors’ union 
membership with an agreement to abandon the vendor title. 
 238. Black Car Drivers Organize in New York City!, AFL-CIO BLOG (May 4, 2012), 
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Organizing-Bargaining/Black-Car-Drivers-Unionize-in-NYC 
[https://perma.cc/EQW5-RCTP] (May 4, 2012). 
 239. TEAMSTER TAXI CAB, www.teamstertaxi.org [https://perma.cc/PG2P-TZ75]. 
 240. H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 707 (1981). 
 241. Id. at 707 n.4. 
 242. Id. at 710. 
 243. Id. at 711. 
 244. Id. at 706, 723. 
 245. 29 U.S.C. § 113 (c) (2016); Am. Fed’n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968). 
 246. Carroll, 391 U.S. at 106. 
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the Supreme Court noted in the Equity case that a party seeking refuge 
in the statutory exemption must be a bona fide labor organization and 
not an independent contractor or entrepreneur.247 In other words, the entity 
developing and enforcing the licensing system must be doing so for the 
purposes of advancing labor policy, not for the purposes of price fixing or 
collusion. In that case, Equity was uncontested as a legitimate labor 
group,248 just as in the New York example the International Association of 
Machinists would likely be ruled a legitimate group. But great caution is 
necessary if on-demand workers proceed in a similar direction without the 
partnership of an established labor group. 
3. On-Demand Workers and Antitrust Law: Liabilities and Exemptions 
a) Noerr–Pennington Doctrine 
Hypothetically, the very act of lobbying or engaging in concerted 
action in support of laws like Seattle’s law could trigger antitrust liability 
for on-demand workers and the labor unions that support them. However, 
as is well established within the labor and antitrust canon, any effort to 
influence the exercise of government power, even for the purpose of 
gaining an anticompetitive advantage, does not create liability under 
antitrust law.249 
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held immune from antitrust liability a 
combination of rail freight interests that was formed in order to pass 
legislation that would grant members of the combination a competitive 
advantage over truckers.250 In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, the 
Court interpreted its decision in Noerr broadly, holding that “concerted 
effort[s] to influence public officials” are shielded from the Sherman Act 
“regardless of intent or purpose.”251 The Court held, “[A] legitimate aim 
of any national labor organization is to obtain uniformity of labor 
standards and that a consequence of such union activity may be to 
                                                     
 247. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. at 717. 
 248. Id. In upholding the combination of Equity and the licensed agents, the Court relied on its 
decision in Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968), which held that independent contractor orchestra leaders 
constituted a labor group within the meaning of the Norris–LaGuardia Act. The orchestra leaders’ 
participation in a union regulated booking system was held not to be an unlawful combination 
between labor and non-labor groups. The trial court assessed whether there was job or wage 
competition or some other economic interrelationship between the union members and the 
independent contractors. 
 249. See, e.g., E. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965). 
 250. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 145. 
 251. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. 
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eliminate competition based on differences in such standards.”252 The 
Court held that “[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not 
violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate 
competition.”253 
The Noerr–Pennington doctrine thus protects the use of political, 
legislative, and judicial processes to seek collective bargaining rights for 
on-demand workers, even if the end result of such efforts is reduced 
competition.254 However, laws like Seattle’s still trigger antitrust liability 
on the part of the sponsoring state or local government itself, which cannot 
claim Noerr–Pennington immunity and instead relies on the State Action 
doctrine, as discussed below. 
b) State Action Immunity Defense 
Seattle, like other states and cities looking to regulate in this space, 
may invoke the State Action Immunity defense in response to the antitrust 
claims of on-demand companies and the Chamber of Commerce. In many 
respects, the innovative legislation passed by the Seattle City Council 
embodies the purpose of the defense, which is to ensure that the proper 
balance of power between the federal government and the state and local 
governments under our federalist system is preserved. Again, a careful 
analysis of the historical purposes and contemporary judicial interpretation 
of this critical defense is necessary to ensure that state and local 
governments may proceed to intervene in the labor relations among on-
demand workers and firms without fear of antitrust liability. 
“[N]othing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its  
history . . . suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state . . . from 
activities directed by its legislature.”255 Consistent with our federalist256 
system of government, state and local governments are given wide latitude 
to regulate local issues related to the environment, health, or public safety. 
                                                     
 252. Id. at 666. 
 253. Id. at 670. The Supreme Court has also applied the Noerr–Pennington doctrine to courts 
and administrative agencies. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,  
510–11 (1972). 
 254. There is an important exception, however. The Noerr–Pennington doctrine does not protect 
litigation from liability under the antitrust laws if the litigation is a “sham.” The Supreme Court in 
Noerr recognized that if an action “ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a 
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationship of a competitor [then] the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” Noerr, 365 
U.S. at 144. See also Cal. Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 511–16 (remanding for determination of 
whether the sham exception to the general immunity from the antitrust laws applied). 
 255. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 349–50 (1943). 
 256. Jorge E. Galva, Christopher Atchison & Samuel Levey, Public Health Strategy and the 
Police Powers of the State, PUB. HEALTH REPS. 20–21 (2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC2569983/pdf/phr120s10020.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM2L-VXPP]. 
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In the pursuit of those interests, however, certain regulatory measures may 
reduce competition. Zoning laws, for example, that seek to create 
sustainable communities by limiting emissions, may force the reduction of 
the number of industrial competitors within a given region. In order to 
preserve the delicate balance of federalism, the Supreme Court has 
articulated a “state action doctrine,” an exemption from antitrust 
liability available to states that decide to have competition yield to 
some form of regulation or control.257 States may have decided that 
competition is unnecessary or inappropriate for a particular industry or 
market, or they simply may have decided that under the circumstances, 
preserving public health is more important than preserving free markets.258 
When a state “acts as a sovereign and adopts a program in its 
governmental capacity, the federal antitrust laws are not intended to 
invalidate such a program.”259 
The Supreme Court first articulated the policies and practicalities 
underlying the state action doctrine in Parker v. Brown, another 
Depression-era case that favored state experimentation over rigid doctrinal 
interpretation.260 The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated the 
proposition that Parker is rooted in federalist principles.261 An 
understanding of the case’s historical background is necessary for an 
accurate understanding of the case’s legal significance. 
In order to alleviate the extreme overproduction in agriculture during 
the Depression, the California legislature passed the California 
Agricultural Prorate Act (CPA) in 1933.262 The CPA authorized the 
                                                     
 257. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exmn’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109–10 (2015). 
 258. See, e.g., Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and 
ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29, 36–37 (2000) (“State governmental action is considered 
immune from federal antitrust liability, even if the state action is anticompetitive, economically 
inefficient, and flatly inconsistent with the federal laws.”). See also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 
U.S. 621, 634 (1992) (stating that the purpose of the state action doctrine is “not to determine whether 
the State has set some normative standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices”). 
 259. In cases where a state acts as a “sovereign” and adopts a program in its governmental 
capacity, federal antitrust laws are not intended to invalidate such programs. See generally Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 260. See generally id. 
 261. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 421 (1978) (“The 
Parker decision was thus firmly grounded on principles of federalism . . . .”); 324 Liquor Corp. v. 
Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 343 (1987) (“Parker v. Brown rests on principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty.”); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc. 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991) ( “Relying 
on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, we held [in Parker] that the Sherman Act did not 
apply to anticompetitive restraints imposed by the States . . . .”). 
 262. The Prorate Act was part of a larger group of “fair trade” laws passed in response to small 
retailers’ vulnerability to the price-cutting and loss leader practices of chain stores. Contemporary use 
of the term “fair trade” has taken on a social-movement meaning. It remains, as Circuit Judge Holmes 
noted in his dissent in Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788, 796 
(5th Cir. 1953), an “attractive misnomer.” 
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creation of a state agency to administer and enforce limitations on 
competition among agricultural growers.263 The agency was empowered 
to approve programs designed to “prevent agricultural waste and 
conserve agricultural wealth of the state without permitting unreasonable 
profits to producers.”264 Proposals were subject to economic analysis, a 
public hearing, and a finding that the program was “reasonably calculated 
to carry out the objectives of the Act.”265 
One such proposal adopted by an Advisory Commission in 1940 was 
a seasonal prorated marketing program that placed limits on growers in 
the marketing and production of raisins.266 Parker, a dissident California 
farmer wanting to grow more raisins than the Commission permitted, 
sought an injunction against the California state officials implementing 
the state law.267 The district court held that the marketing program was 
an illegal interference with interstate commerce and granted Parker 
injunctive relief.268 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the prorate 
program “was never intended to operate by force of individual 
agreement or combination.”269 The Court was unwilling to restrain such 
action because the prorated system, and indeed the Commission itself, 
derived its authority from the California legislature.270 Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Stone explained that “nothing in the language 
of the Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggests that its purpose was to 
restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its 
legislature.”271 
In Southern Moor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 
the Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test for determining whether a 
                                                     
 263. The Prorate Act authorized the creation of an Advisory Commission of nine members, of 
which a state official, the Director of Agriculture, was exofficio a member. The other eight members 
were appointed for terms of four years by the Governor and confirmed by the state Senate, and were 
required to take an oath of office. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 347. 
 266. Id. In the 1930s and 1940s, almost all of the raisins consumed in the United States, and 
nearly one-half of raisins consumed worldwide, were produced in California. Id. at 345. 
 267. Id. at 344. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 350. 
 270. The adoption of legislative measures to prevent the demoralization of the agricultural 
industry by stabilizing the raisin crop was a matter of state as well as national concern and, in the 
absence of inconsistent Congressional action, was a problem whose solution was peculiarly within 
the province of the state. In the exercise of its power, the state adopted a measure appropriate to the 
end sought. The program was not aimed at (nor did it) discriminate against interstate commerce, 
although it undoubtedly affected interstate commerce by increasing the price and decreasing the 
volume of raisins to some undetermined extent. Id. at 367. 
 271. Id. at 350–51. 
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state is entitled to immunity for its anticompetitive activity.272 A 
challenged state policy that expressly permits but does not compel 
anticompetitive conduct must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed as state policy.”273 Second, the policy must be “‘actively 
supervised’ by the State itself.”274 The Court ruled that “[a] private party 
acting pursuant to an anticompetitive regulatory program need not 
‘point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization’ for its challenged 
conduct.”275 Rather, “[a]s long as the State as sovereign clearly intends 
to displace competition in a particular field with a regulatory structure, 
the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied.”276 Under the second prong 
of the test, a defendant must show that the anticompetitive policy was 
actively supervised by the state.277 “[T]he analysis asks whether the State 
has played a substantial role in determining the specifics of the 
economic policy. The question is . . . whether the anticompetitive scheme 
is the State’s own.”278 
Seattle’s ordinance establishing a regulatory structure for collective 
bargaining between rideshare drivers and rideshare platforms could satisfy 
both prongs of the test. On-demand workers would not be compelled 
to bargain the terms and conditions of their contracted labor, but rather 
such activity would be permitted by a clearly articulated intention of 
the state. By creating a regulatory structure such as the Seattle ordinance, 
the state would fulfill the second prong by taking an active role in 
executing its stated policy. 
The ability to subtract from states’ sovereign powers is not, as 
Justice Stone indicated, a power to be lightly attributed to Congress. As 
more recently affirmed by the Court in North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, 
Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free 
market structures. However, requiring States to conform to the 
mandates of the Sherman Act at the expense of other values a State 
may deem fundamental would impose an impermissible burden on 
the States’ power to regulate. Therefore, beginning with Parker v. 
Brown . . . this Court interpreted the antitrust laws to confer immunity 
                                                     
 272. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985) (stating 
that Midcal’s two-part test applied to private parties’ claims of state action immunity). 
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on the anticompetitive conduct of States acting in their sovereign 
capacity.279  
The critical question for Seattle (and cities like New York and 
Cincinnati, which are currently considering similar measures),280 however, 
is whether cities may also claim immunity using the state action doctrine 
when regulating the on-demand economy in ways that potentially reduce 
competition. Just as a state does not immunize individuals who violate 
the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it or by merely 
declaring their actions lawful, neither does the state immunize 
municipalities by fiat. Such immunity, at the city level, is not automatic; 
the particular facts matter. If a state government delegates its authority to 
a local government that acts to restrain trade, then the local government 
must show its actions were taken pursuant to a “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition.”281 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health Systems, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held that a Georgia law establishing special 
purpose public entities called hospital authorities did not permit those 
hospital authorities to engage in corporate acquisitions that substantially 
reduced competition in the market area.282 Simply being endowed with 
general corporate powers, including the power to acquire hospitals, does 
not in and of itself entitle the sub-state agency to a blanket antitrust 
immunity.283 Because the state’s general grant of powers to the hospital 
authority did not include permission to use those powers 
anticompetitively, the Court held that the clear articulation test was not 
satisfied and state-action immunity did not apply.284 
Similarly, in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. 
Federal Trade Commission, deeming the practice of dentistry a matter of 
public concern compelling regulation, the State of North Carolina passed 
                                                     
 279. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exmn’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1104 (2015). 
 280. O’Brien, supra note 140. 
 281. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair, 971 U.S. 34, 42–44 (1985). If a state government 
delegates its authority to a private person who acts to restrain trade, then the private person must show 
(1) his or her actions were taken pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state 
policy to displace competition,” and (2) the policy is “actively supervised” by the state government. 
The Supreme Court has hinted at a “commercial” or “market participant” exception to state action 
immunity, where the state “acts not in a regulatory capacity but as a commercial participant in a given 
market.” The circuits that have addressed the issue are split, with the Tenth Circuit yet to weigh in on 
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 282. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1007 (2013). 
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 284. Id. Cf. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) (upholding the 
ability of the City of Columbia, South Carolina, to maintain an effective monopoly over billboards 
since the state’s zoning regulation allowed the city to regulate the size, location and spacing of 
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the Dental Practices Act.285 The Act established a board of dental 
examiners, which was empowered to create, administer, and enforce a 
licensing system for dentists.286 Six of the eight board members must be 
licensed dentists engaged in the active practice of dentistry and elected by 
other licensed dentists in North Carolina.287 While the Act itself does not 
explicitly designate “teeth whitening services” as a matter of dental 
practice, members of the board—concerned with the cheaper prices that 
non-dentists had begun charging for the service—voted to restrict the 
practice to licensed dentists.288 The FTC brought suit, alleging that the 
decision was anticompetitive and a violation of antitrust law.289 While the 
board argued that its decision was consistent with the public health 
directives of the Dental Practices Act, the FTC rejected this argument, 
noting that teeth whitening performed by non-dentists is a safe, cosmetic 
procedure.290 
Following the Fourth Circuit’s affirmation of the decision in favor of 
the FTC, the Supreme Court considered whether North Carolina was 
entitled to Parker immunity.291 Given the structure of the board of dental 
examiners, which was overwhelmingly dominated by active market 
participants, the Court concluded that the second prong of the Midcal 
test—active supervision by the state—was factually impossible to meet in 
this case.292 Dentists monitoring dentists (who had a clear interest in 
restricting the ability of non-dentists to provide teeth whitening services) 
did not constitute active state supervision.293 And since the state was not 
actively monitoring the decisions of the board, in this case with respect to 
teeth whitening, the Court held that the board could not claim state action 
immunity.294 
In her remarks following the North Carolina decision, FTC 
Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen restated that municipalities do not 
need to follow the active monitoring prong.295 Municipalities, she 
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explained, are electorally accountable and lack the private profit-making 
incentives characteristic of active market participants.296 State agencies 
controlled by market participants, however, are more like private trade 
associations with considerable self-interest.297 Cities engaged in traditional 
functions, however, do not pose a similar risk. To require a state to actively 
monitor such activities, simply to avoid antitrust liability, would be 
unnecessarily burdensome. 
Likewise, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light, the 
court reaffirmed that cities are a “far cry from the private accumulations 
of wealth that the Sherman Act was intended to regulate.”298 For that 
reason, cities are not required to point to a specific statute that authorizes 
the anticompetitive activity, so long as that activity could be reasonably 
contemplated when it authorized the agency generally. The only limitation 
that the North Carolina case seems to have clarified is that market 
participant dominance can transform what would otherwise be permissible 
anticompetitive conduct by a state into prohibited antitrust violation. 
In the case of the Seattle ordinance, the state has authorized the city’s 
Finance and Administrative Services Agency to regulate for-hire 
transportation, such as rideshare and traditional taxicab services. The 
agency describes itself as having the most diverse set of responsibilities of 
any city government, including consumer protection, business regulation, 
and taxi licensing.299 This authority stands in stark contrast to the 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) in St. Louis, which, 
acting more like the conflicted dentists in North Carolina than an 
independent oversight charged with public safety, took a hard stance 
against Uber and Lyft.300 The MTC is more like a traditional taxi 
commission made up of people with personal ties to the taxi and limousine 
industry and is arguably closer to the North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners than the Finance and Administrative Services Agency. 
It is also more difficult to pinpoint the anticompetitive activity. 
Unlike the grease peddlers case, where independent contractors banded 
together in a sham union in order to fix prices, in this case, the city would 
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serve as a neutral broker of contract between a company and a contractor. 
This is a role that the city likely already plays—whether in real estate, 
construction, municipal finance, or education. And as with all labor 
contracts, there is no requirement that any increase in profit margin 
potentially available to drivers, as a result of negotiations, would require 
any additional cost to consumers. Helping establish minimum standards in 
an industry with direct contact with consumers is a critical role that local 
governments frequently play. 
Antitrust policy is theoretically designed to benefit the consumer 
by restricting or prohibiting anticompetitive practices that tend to inflate 
prices and reduce consumer choice. In 1890, ostensibly to curb the 
unbridled power of monopolies such as Standard Oil, Congress passed the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.301 Though designed to increase competition and 
help consumers, it did not take long for employers to co-opt the law to 
suppress worker organizing. In case after case—from boycotting hat 
makers in Connecticut,302 to striking coal miners in Pennsylvania,303 to 
picketing furniture haulers in Washington—courts issued injunctions 
against workers and unions based on a distorted interpretation of antitrust 
law. This winning streak for employers came to a halt in 1935, when 
passage of the National Labor Relations Act gave workers the right to form 
a union and halted the perverse application of a law designed to check the 
unrestrained power of corporations to working men and women struggling 
to obtain a living wage.304 
CONCLUSION 
On-demand employers persistently classify their workers as 
independent contractors in a thinly veiled attempt to lower overhead costs 
and maximize profit. Yet, if Uber drivers are truly independent 
contractors, then they should have the right to negotiate the terms of their 
contract with the company. Cities like Seattle should be able to regulate 
the process of negotiating those contracts in the same way it might 
facilitate negotiations around school construction contracts or industry 
licensing agreements. If, however, the drivers are actually employees, a 
conclusion that at least two federal courts have suggested there is factual 
basis to support, then those workers should enjoy the same right under the 
National Labor Relations Act. 
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In the absence of judicial clarity or federal regulatory leadership on 
this critical issue of employment status, state and local governments 
should be free to experiment in this space in order to remedy the growing 
disparity created by the structure of work within the on-demand economy. 
Because Seattle’s innovative approach treats drivers as independent 
contractors, not as employees operating within the scope of the NLRA, the 
city should be able to clear its preemption hurdle. Seattle and the State of 
Washington should likewise be able to enjoy immunity from antitrust 
liability under the state action doctrine, which recognizes that federal 
antitrust policy is in no way intended to interfere with the kind of 
innovative regulation and protection of workers and consumers in the on-
demand economy that Seattle has crafted. 
Federal labor and antitrust laws were designed to alleviate economic 
inequality and protect consumers. The Seattle ordinance advances both 
goals. Until federal laws defining employee status reflect the economic 
realities of the on-demand economy, state and local measures like Seattle’s 
are necessary to ensure that as technology transports us into the future, 
those who make that technology possible and profitable are not deported 
to the past. 
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APPENDIX A. 
 
State Enacted Legislation Notable Features 
Alabama None   
Alaska None   






mandates a zero-tolerance 
policy for drug and alcohol 






jurisdiction (and therefore 
limits power of cities to 






TNCs to perform criminal 
background checks and 
enforce a zero-tolerance 
policy for drug and alcohol 
use while driving; prohibits 
street hails and cash rides; 
establishes rebuttable 
presumption that drivers are 
independent contractors and 
therefore ineligible to 
receive workers’ 
compensation. 
                                                     
 305. H.B. 2135, 52nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015), https://legiscan.com/AZ/text/HB2135/id/ 
1201440 [https://perma.cc/3WFG-UMTD]. 
 306. H.B. 1773, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ 
assembly/2013/2013R/Acts/Act1053.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3BL-RZ4X]. 
 307. S.B. 800, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ 
assembly/2015/2015R/Bills/SB800.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW6A-F4RY]. 
1038 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:987 
State Enacted Legislation Notable Features 
California 2014 AB 2293308 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements for TNCs and 




TNCs must pay an annual 




background checks and 
vehicle safety inspections; 
mandates a zero-tolerance 
policy for drug and alcohol 
use while driving; exempts 
TNCs from regulations 
applicable to common 
carriers. 
Connecticut None310  







mandates a zero-tolerance 
policy for drug and alcohol 
use; deregulates fares for 
digital dispatch; exempts 
private for-hire vehicles 
from licensing 
requirements. 
                                                     
 308. A.B. 2293, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB2293 [https://perma.cc/H4T8-YBEY]. 
 309. S.B. 14-125, 69th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014), http://tornado.state.co.us/ 
gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/sl2014a/sl_323.htm [https://perma.cc/K7MC-GJQL]. 
 310. In 2014, the Connecticut Department of Transportation commissioned a report that 
recommended how the state should approach regulating rideshare companies like Uber and Lyft. To 
date, none of those recommendations have been enacted. Christine Stuart, State Legislators to Resume 
Uber-Lyft Debate on Regulation, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.nhregister.com/ 
business/20170102/state-legislators-to-resume-uber-lyft-debate-on-regulation [https://perma.cc/ 
5FW7-8CNN]. 
 311. Act A20-0489, 2013 Council, 20th Council (D.C. 2013), https://legiscan.com/DC/text/B20-
0753/2013 [https://perma.cc/NY3L-AGMT]. 
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State Enacted Legislation Notable Features 
Delaware 2016 SB 262312  
Florida None313   
Georgia 2015 HB 190314 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements for TNCs and 
participating drivers. 
Hawaii None315   
Idaho 2015 HB 316316 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements for TNCs and 
participating drivers. 
Illinois 2015 SB 2774317 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements for TNCs and 
participating drivers; 
mandates background 
checks; requires a zero-
tolerance policy for drug 
and alcohol conviction; and 
requires compliance with 
non-discrimination 
provisions;  
                                                     
 312. S.B. 262, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2016), https://legiscan.com/DE/text/ 
SB262/2015 [https://perma.cc/8C3R-SHKG]. 
 313. Attempts to pass statewide regulation reached an impasse during the last legislative session. 
Michael Auslen, Plan to Regulate Uber, Lyft all but Dead in the Florida Legislature, MIAMI  
HERALD (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/ 
article65208997.html [https://perma.cc/3QQV-NFQ7]. 
 314. H.B. 190, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/2692509-HB-190.html [https://perma.cc/7Z4Y-8FQH]. 
 315. While statewide regulation has not yet been enacted, Honolulu’s city council has passed a 
bill that regulates TNCs and their associated drivers, which includes background check requirements, 
license fees, and other provisions. HONOLULU, HAW., Bill 55, Amending Ordinance 16-25, Relating 
to Private Transportation Services and Drivers (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www4.honolulu.gov/docushare/ 
dsweb/Get/Document-189170/DOC007%20(23).PDF [https://perma.cc/3M7H-SACA]. 
 316. H.B. 316, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2015), https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/sessioninfo/2015/legislation/H0316.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW3A-HDZV]. 
 317. S.B. 2774, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015), http://ilga.gov/legislation/f 
ulltext.asp?DocName=09800SB2774enr&GA=98&SessionId=85&DocTypeId=SB&LegID=78615
&DocNum=2774&GAID=12&Session= [https://perma.cc/37PX-5PVX]. 
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State Enacted Legislation Notable Features 
Indiana 2015 HB 1278318 Requires TNC to have a 
permit issued by the Indiana 
department of state revenue 
and establishes 
requirements regarding 
criminal and driving history, 
drug and alcohol use, 
vehicle equipment, 
insurance, fares, privacy, 
nondiscrimination and 
accessibility, and TNC and 
TNC driver conduct. 
Iowa None   
Kansas 2015 SB 117319 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements; mandates 
background checks; requires 
compliance with non-
discrimination provisions; 
and requires zero-tolerance 
for drug and alcohol use 
convictions (Governor’s 
veto overridden). 
Kentucky 2015 SB 153320 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements; extends 
licensing and bonding 
requirements to TNC 
operators and participating 
drivers; and includes 
“independent contractors” 
among the entities required 
to undergo background 
checks. 
                                                     
 318. HB 1278, 119th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015)., https://iga.in.gov/legislative/ 
2015/bills/house/1278 [https://perma.cc/7T2T-B8G2]. 
 319. SB 117, 2015 Leg., (Kan. 2015), http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/ 
measures/documents/sb117_enrolled.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK6C-678E]. 
 320. SB 153, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2015), http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/15RS/sb153.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J8A2-QTQK]. 
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State Enacted Legislation Notable Features 
Louisiana 2015 SB 172321 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements. 







permit ($10,000) for TNCs; 
entails a driver requirement; 
mandates compliances with 
non-discrimination 
provisions; and prohibits 
street hails by TNC drivers 
(Governor’s veto 
overridden). 
Maryland 2015 SB 868323 Requires TNCs to receive a 
permit from the Public 
Service Commission to 
operate within the state; 
authorizes municipalities to 
impose an assessment on 
any TNC within its 
jurisdiction; and establishes 
minimum liability insurance 
requirements. 
Massachusetts Pending   
Michigan 2016324   
                                                     
 321. SB 172, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 215), https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ 
ViewDocument.aspx?d=935305 [https://perma.cc/AC79-KNGK]. 
 322. H.P. 934 - L.D. 1379, 127th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015), http://www.mainelegislature.org/ 
legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP0934&item=3&snum=127) [https://perma.cc/W5RX-NJLJ]. 
 323. SB 868, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/ 
bills/sb/sb0868t.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UZH-PNCL]. 
 324. On December 22, 2016, Governor Rick Snyder signed a package of bills bringing rideshare 
companies into regulatory line with traditional taxis. The bills, which are effective immediately, 
increase regulatory requirements for Uber and other TNCs, while correspondingly decreasing 
regulations for traditional taxicab operators. Emily Lawyer, Snyder Signs Bills Upping Uber 
Regulations, Decreasing Them for Taxis, MLIVE.COM (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.mlive.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2016/12/snyder_signs_bills_upping_uber.html [https://perma.cc/S94A-EK8P]. 
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Mississippi None   
Missouri Pending   
Montana 2015 SB 396326 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements; creates a new 
class of motor carriers for 
TNCs (“Class E”) and 
exempts Class E carriers 
from having to obtain a 
Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity 
from the State Public 
Service Commission. 
Nebraska 2015   
Nevada 2015 AB 175327 Authorizes the Public 
Utilities Commission to 
issue a permit to any TNC 
compliant with minimum 
requirements, including 
minimum liability insurance 
requirement, and mandates 
TNC payment (3% of the 
total fare) to the State 
Treasurer. 
New Hampshire None   
New Jersey Pending328   
                                                     
 325. S.F. 1679, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2015), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/ 
?year=2015&type=0&doctype=Chapter&id=48 [https://perma.cc/VR8V-9W9T]. 
 326. SB 396, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2015), https://legiscan.com/MT/text/SB396/id/ 
1164665 [https://perma.cc/4PAU-99N7]. 
 327. AB 175, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/78th2015/ 
Bills/AB/AB175_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/STG2-CRFQ]. 
 328. State legislature approved bills requiring minimum liability insurance, background checks, 
and related requirements were approved by the state legislature. They await Governor Chris Christie’s 
signature. Claire Lowe, Ride-Hailing Rules Head to Governor’s Desk, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Dec. 
26, 2016), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/business/ride-hailing-rules-head-to-governor-s-
desk/article_a0089f95-aeb9-5f98-9823-d7d84c977c2c.html [https://perma.cc/8A3Y-HFB9]. 
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State Enacted Legislation Notable Features 
New Mexico 2016 HB 0168329 Requires TNCs to apply 
annually for a permit from 
the public regulation 
commission; establishes 
minimum liability insurance 
requirements; mandates a 
zero-tolerance policy for 
drug and alcohol use while 
driving or using the 
network; mandates 
background checks; and 
establishes a fund within the 
state treasury to ensure the 
safety and financial 
responsibility of TNC 
operators.  
New York Pending   
North Carolina 2015 SB 541330 TNCs must apply for a 
permit ($5,000) to operate 
inside the state; establishes 
minimum liability insurance 
requirements; mandates 
background checks and 
other driver standards; 
creates a rebuttable 
presumption that drivers for 
TNCs are independent 
contractors; and restricts the 
right of cities and 
municipalities from 
enacting more stringent 
requirements or imposing 
any fees on TNCs or their 
drivers.  
                                                     
 329. HB 0168, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2016), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/ 
16%20Regular/final/HB0168.pdf [https://perma.cc/2282-TYCD]. 
 330. SB 541, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session (N.C. 2015), http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/ 
2015/Bills/Senate/PDF/S541v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFC5-GX9E]. 
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North Dakota 2015 HB 1144331 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements. 
Ohio 2015 HB 237332 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements and allows for 
an electronic form of “proof 
of insurance” to be carried 
by a TNC driver.  





TNCs and participating 
drivers from the definition 
of “motor carrier” and “taxi 
services”; requires 
background checks, zero-
tolerance drug and alcohol 
use policies, and 
compliance with non-
discrimination provisions; 
restricts release of passenger 
information to third parties 
without consent; and 
requires TNCs to obtain an 
annual operating permit 
($5,000). 
Oregon None   
Pennsylvania Pending SB 984334 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements.  
                                                     
 331. H.B. 1144, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2015), http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/64-2015/ 
documents/15-0434-06000.pdf?20160403153437 [https://perma.cc/4FA2-XZDC]. 
 332. H.B. 237, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016), https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/ 
legislation/legislation-status?id=GA131-HB-237 [https://perma.cc/RX9E-YVQT]. 
 333. H.B. 1614, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/ 
cf_pdf/2015-16%20ENR/hB/HB1614%20ENR.PDF [https://perma.cc/4NDD-WJ7V]. 
 334. S.B. 984, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/ 
CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=HTM&sessYr=2015&sessInd=0&billBody=S&bi
llTyp=B&billNbr=0984&pn=2167 [https://perma.cc/BP2U-HWWC]. 
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State Enacted Legislation Notable Features 
Rhode Island 2016335  Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements; requires 
drivers to be regulated by 
the Public Utilities 
Commission; requires 
background checks; and 
requires an annual permit 
for TNCs ($30,000). 
South Carolina 2015 Bill 3525336 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements; requires TNC 
drivers to affix a visible sign 
on their vehicle (“trade 
dress”) at all times while 
operating on the digital 
network; requires TNC 
drivers to obtain a vehicle 
inspection within 30 days of 
working for the TNC, and 
specifies the elements of 
such inspection; requires 
TNCs to perform criminal 
background checks with 
zero tolerance for drug and 
alcohol violations; prohibits 
street hails; and assesses 
TNCs 1% of all fares 
annually to be used to 
enforce these standards.  
                                                     
 335. Matt O’Brien, Rhode Island Passes Ride-Hailing Bill to Regulate Uber, Lyft, TURNTO10 
(June 21, 2016), http://turnto10.com/politics/rhode-island-passes-ride-hailing-bill-to-regulate-uber-
lyft [https://perma.cc/QM7C-528R]. 
 336. H.B. 3225, Gen. Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2016), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/ 
sess121_2015-2016/prever/3525_20150618.htm [https://perma.cc/E8ZU-J2YK]. 
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South Dakota 2016 HB 1091337 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements; requires 
TNCs to establish and 
enforce zero-tolerance 
policies for drug and 
alcohol use by drivers, 
including investigation; 
requires criminal 
background and driving 
history checks; exempts 
specific farm machinery and 
equipment from the 
definition of motor carrier; 
and restricts their ability to 
modify the minimum 
insurance requirements 
established by the bill 
although they do not 
prohibit municipalities from 
regulating TNCs. 
Tennessee 2015 HB 0992338 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements; mandates 
third party criminal 
background checks and 
zero-tolerance policies for 
drug and alcohol use by 
drivers; distinguishes TNCs 
from taxicab companies; 
and restricts sharing of 
passenger information to 
third parties without 
consent. 
                                                     
 337. H.B. 1091, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2016), http://sdlegislature.gov/legislative_ 
session/bills/Bill.aspx?File=HB1091ENR.htm&Session=2016 [https://perma.cc/V92C-QM5E]. 
 338. H.B. 0992, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015), http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/ 
Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=HB0992&ga=109 [https://perma.cc/3QVB-23SD]. 
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State Enacted Legislation Notable Features 
Texas 2015 HB 1733339 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements and 
establishes that TNCs do 
not “control” automobiles or 
drivers except as agreed by 
contract. 
Utah 2014 HB 24340  
Vermont None   
Virginia 2015 HB 1662341 Carves out TNCs and their 
drivers from many of the 
regulations governing 
taxicabs and common 
carriers; requires TNC 
drivers to pay an annual $33 
fee (applicable to non-
commercial drivers but not 
to taxicabs); establishes 
minimum liability insurance 
standards ($1M); requires 
TNCs to purchase a license 
($100,000); and requires 
drivers to be 21 years of age 
and to undergo a 
background check. 
Washington  2015 SB 5550342 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements. 
                                                     
 339. H.B. 1733, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015), http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/ 
billtext/pdf/HB01733F.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/F4Y6-YMRB]. 
 340. H.B. 24, 60th Leg, 2014 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014), http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/static/ 
HB0024.html [https://perma.cc/W2CP-77SB]. 
 341. H.B. 1662, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?151+ful+CHAP0002 [https://perma.cc/UM7L-89YS]. 
 342. SB 5550, 64th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2015-
16/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/5550-S.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/JTJ9-9EZQ]. 
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West Virginia 2016 HB 4228343 Establishes minimum 
liability insurance 
requirements; requires that 
TNCs obtain a permit and 
pay annual permit fee; 
establishes requirements for 
criminal background checks 
and zero-tolerance policies 
for drugs and alcohol while 
driving; prohibits street 
hails and cash rides; and 
establishes a framework for 
classifying drivers as 
independent contractors 




regulating TNCs; requires 
that TNCs obtain a license 
and pay an annual license 
fee ($5,000); prohibits street 
hails and cash rides; 
mandates background 
checks and a zero tolerance 
policy for alcohol and drug 
use while driving; and 
exempts TNCs from certain 
requirements applicable to 
common motor carriers. 
Wyoming  None   
 
                                                     
 343. HB 4228, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016), http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Status/ 
bills_text.cfm?billdoc=HB4228%20SUB%20ENR.htm&yr=2016&sesstype=RS&billtype=B&house
orig=H&i=4228 [https://perma.cc/QS4U-46YT]. 
 344. AB 143, 2015 Leg. (Wis. 2016), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2015/related/proposals/ 
ab143 [https://perma.cc/9V7T-VBJH]. 
